Imphal Review of Arts and Politics

The Northeast is a complex ethnic mosaic still not quite fitting into the Indian mainstream ethos

Northeast: A Forgotten Colonial Plan, a Changing Religious Map and a Turbulent Neighbourhood

In the years before independence, a confidential idea circulated among senior British officials: that the hill areas of Assam and western Burma should not pass to India or Burma at all, but remain under the Crown. The proposal, known today as the Reid–Coupland Plan, has recently resurfaced on social media as “untold history”, often with the suggestion that it laid the foundation for later movements in the Northeast and that it is linked to the region’s religious change. The history is real. Most of the conclusions drawn from it are not.

The plan’s formal origin is a note written in November 1941 by Sir Robert Reid, then Governor of Assam. Reid, drawing on earlier ideas from officers such as N. E. Parry and J. H. Hutton, argued that the hill peoples differed fundamentally from the plains and that the India–Burma border drawn in 1937 was artificial. He proposed a single British-administered agency stretching from the Naga, Lushai and Khasi hills and the North-East Frontier tracts to the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the Chin Hills and the northern Shan States, with a population he estimated at about 2.5 million. Secretary of State Leo Amery passed the note to the Oxford historian Reginald Coupland, who aired it publicly in his study of India’s constitutional problem. That is how Coupland’s name became attached to someone else’s idea.

The scheme never came close to adoption. Reid’s own successor, Sir Andrew Clow, argued in 1945 that a landlocked patchwork of sparsely populated hills would be economically unviable and fiercely opposed by Indian opinion. Viceroy Wavell called it impracticable. After Labour won the 1945 British election, the idea lost its main patron, and on 6 May 1946 the India Office concluded that handing the tribal areas to any outside authority had become impossible. Just as important, hill leaders themselves helped bury it. Nehru persuaded the Khasi leader Rev. J. J. M. Nichols-Roy to back union with India; the Mizo Union opposed a plan that would have preserved chieftainship; and the Naga National Council rejected it in June 1946.

One detail undermines the popular claim that the plan was a design for a Christian enclave. Several of the officers who favoured separate administration of the hills were critical of missionaries, whom they accused of eroding the very tribal cultures they wished to protect. The Crown Colony was an administrative and strategic project of a departing empire, not a missionary one. Its real legacy is quieter: it reflected a long colonial habit of governing the hills apart from the plains, a habit that later shaped the Sixth Schedule and special constitutional provisions, and it drew attention to a border that cut through Naga, Chin, Kuki and Mizo communities. That border, rather than the plan, is what still matters.

The growth of Christianity in the region is striking. According to the 2011 census, the most recent religious data available, Christians form 87.9 per cent of the population of Nagaland, 87.2 per cent in Mizoram and 74.6 per cent in Meghalaya. In Manipur they are 41.3 per cent, level with Hindus, and in Arunachal Pradesh 30.3 per cent, up from under one per cent in 1971. The fastest growth between 2001 and 2011 was in Arunachal and Manipur.

What the numbers conceal is where converts came from. In Arunachal, the census category for indigenous faiths fell from 64 per cent of the population in 1971 to 26 per cent in 2011. In Manipur, about 97 per cent of Scheduled Tribe members are Christian, while Christians are under four per cent in the valley districts. Religious change in the Northeast has overwhelmingly been a shift within tribal societies away from village-based indigenous religions, not a movement out of Hinduism or Islam.

Why Christianity rather than Hinduism? Historians point to structural reasons. Traditional Hinduism had no simple rite of entry for outsiders, and incorporation usually meant a place, often a low one, in the caste order; Christianity offered immediate, equal membership. Missions gave Mizo and many Naga languages a written script, and ran the first schools and clinics, so the faith became tied to literacy and jobs. In the hills, Hinduism was associated with plains traders and officials, while Christianity allowed communities to modernise without being absorbed into a plains identity. The historian Richard Eaton showed that the biggest wave of Naga conversions came after 1947, when foreign missionaries had largely left, suggesting that local churches and communal decisions, not foreign pressure alone, drove the change. Where Hinduism did spread in the region, among the Meiteis, Tripuris and Ahoms, it came through kings rather than missions.

The Manipur valley shows the reverse movement. Meitei memory centres on King Pamheiba, known as Garib Niwaz, who made Vaishnavism the state religion in the early eighteenth century, and on the burning of Meitei manuscripts traditionally dated to 1729, though historians debate the details. A revival of the indigenous Sanamahi faith began in 1930, gained strength with the founding of the Meitei Marup in 1945, and was marked by a symbolic mass return in 1974. By 2011, about 8.2 per cent of Manipur’s population identified with it, and the state assembly has asked for a separate census code. The drivers are Meitei ethnic pride, the restoration of the Meitei Mayek script and opposition to caste, rather than rejection of faith. Many households observe both traditions, and the old friction between Meitei Hindus and Sanamahists has eased.

Arunachal Pradesh is where these currents now meet. Its Freedom of Religion Act of 1978, which bans conversion by force or inducement, sat unenforced for decades because rules were never framed. A 2024 Gauhati High Court direction revived the process, and in April and May 2026 the Arunachal Christian Forum organised protests across the state demanding repeal. It is tempting to read this as a Hindu–Christian quarrel. It is more accurately a disagreement within tribes, between those who see indigenous faiths such as Donyi-Polo as heritage to be protected and those, often from the same families, who see the law as a curb on freedom of conscience. No independent study has measured how many conversions involve inducement, and claims on both sides remain largely anecdotal.

Does religion drive the region’s violence? The evidence says no. Mizoram, nearly 90 per cent Christian, has been among India’s most peaceful states since the 1986 Mizo Accord. Assam, where Christians are under four per cent, endured one of the longest insurgencies, led by groups that were ethnic or secular-nationalist. Across the region, the Union Home Ministry reports that insurgency incidents in 2025 were 82 per cent lower than in 2014, following accords in Tripura, Assam and Meghalaya.

Manipur is the exception, and it is instructive. The conflict that erupted on 3 May 2023 between the largely Hindu Meitei and the largely Christian Kuki-Chin has killed more than 260 people and displaced about 60,000, and churches and temples were burned. But its central issues are land, Scheduled Tribe status and competing homeland claims. The proof came in February 2026, when a brawl at Litan in Ukhrul escalated into clashes between Naga and Kuki communities, both overwhelmingly Christian. Human Rights Watch counted 34 deaths in that violence by early September. Shared faith did not prevent it, just as it did not prevent the Naga–Kuki clashes of the 1990s, in which an estimated 2,000 people died.

That also answers a question sometimes asked in the region: could the Northeast’s Christians be united? In a religious and civic sense, they already cooperate through regional church councils, joint education and relief work, and churches have often acted as peacemakers. But churches are organised by denomination, tribe and language, and when land is at stake, tribe has repeatedly outweighed faith. A region-wide Christian political bloc is neither realistic nor desirable; it would alarm Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist and indigenous-faith neighbours and run against the secular basis of Indian politics. The constructive role for churches is as bridges between communities, not as a political force.

The region’s Muslim population deserves the same careful reading. Muslims were 34.2 per cent of Assam’s population in 2011, and are a significant minority in Tripura and Manipur at about 8.5 per cent each, but small elsewhere. In Assam they form majorities in several border and riverine districts. Their growth reflects colonial-era settlement of East Bengali farmers, migration around 1947 and 1971, higher fertility that has since narrowed, and undocumented migration whose scale remains fiercely disputed. Official and political estimates vary by millions, while some analysts note that Assam’s Muslim growth between 1971 and 1991 was close to the national Muslim rate. The final National Register of Citizens in 2019 excluded about 1.9 million people, Hindus as well as Muslims.

Public debate also merges communities that are quite distinct: Assamese-speaking Muslims present for centuries, whom the Assam government recognised as indigenous in 2022; Bengali-speaking Muslims of the Barak Valley; settlers of the Brahmaputra’s river islands; and the Meitei Pangal of Manipur, who speak Meiteilon and have largely stayed out of that state’s conflict. The impact of Muslim population growth has been political rather than religious. It fuelled the Assam Movement of 1979 to 1985 and the tragedy of Nellie in 1983, and it underlies today’s arguments over citizenship, evictions and land. Islamist militancy has remained marginal compared with ethnic insurgency.

All of this now unfolds against a turbulent neighbourhood. Myanmar’s civil war, now in its sixth year, has pushed tens of thousands of refugees into Mizoram and Manipur, many of them Chin people who are kin to the Mizos. The Arakan Army controls most of Rakhine State, including the route of India’s Kaladan connectivity project. In March 2026 the National Investigation Agency arrested six Ukrainians and an American accused of crossing from Mizoram into Myanmar to supply drones to armed groups, reviving talk of a “Coupland Plan Redux”. The foreign involvement is a real security concern; a Western design to carve a new state out of the Northeast remains speculation without evidence.

In Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party won a two-thirds majority in February 2026 and Tarique Rahman became Prime Minister, with Jamaat-e-Islami as the main opposition. Delhi remembers that insurgent groups found shelter across the border during the BNP’s earlier term, and that the Hasina government later dismantled much of that network; how the new government handles the issue will matter greatly to Tripura, Meghalaya, Assam and Mizoram. To the north, China began building a 60,000-megawatt hydropower project on the Yarlung Tsangpo in July 2025, a short distance from Arunachal Pradesh. India’s answer, a large dam on the Siang, is itself opposed by Adi villagers who fear submergence.

Meanwhile, India’s decision in 2024 to end the Free Movement Regime and fence the 1,643-kilometre Myanmar border has been opposed by the assemblies of Mizoram and Nagaland and by Naga, Mizo and Kuki groups, because it divides families and clans. Here the colonial past is most visible. The line that Reid called artificial in 1941 still runs through villages, churches and kin networks, and it is the common thread linking refugee flows, arms routes and insurgent sanctuaries.

The lesson is not that faith is irrelevant, but that in the Northeast religion tends to follow ethnicity rather than lead it. Tribes adopted Christianity as a marker of modern identity; part of the Meitei community is reviving Sanamahism as a marker of its own; and the Muslim question in Assam is at heart a dispute over language, land and citizenship. Treating the region’s problems as a religious contest, or as the work of foreign plotters, obscures what needs fixing.

That points to practical priorities: a political settlement in Manipur that brings Meitei, Kuki-Chin and Naga representatives to the same table; border management designed with, not against, border communities; conversion rules, if enforced, that punish only proven force or fraud and apply equally to every faith; fair and transparent citizenship procedures; and prompt release of detailed religion and tribe data from the 2027 census. The Crown Colony was rejected eighty years ago. The frontier it tried to define is still waiting for answers.

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