Why the Central Government Keeps Extending the Manipur Inquiry Commission’s Report Deadline

When the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) set up the Commission of Inquiry on June 4, 2023, to probe the Manipur violence involving two communities – Meiteis and Kuki-Zomis,  the expectation was that within six months, India would have a fact-based account of one of the most devastating episodes of violent conflict involving ethnic groups in the Northeast in decades. Chaired by former Gauhati High Court Chief Justice Ajai Lamba, and retired IAS officer Himanshu Shekhar Das and retired IPS officer Aloka Prabhakar as members, the commission was tasked with unearthing the truth, assigning accountability, and providing a framework for reconciliation.

Yet, within 29 months, four extensions have been granted – the latest pushing the deadline to November 20, 2025. What explains this repeated delay?

At one level, the explanation lies in bureaucratic caution and the scale of the tragedy – over 61,000 displaced, more than 270 lives lost, at least 34 still missing, thousands of homes burnt down and destroyed, and villages bulldozed. But the deeper reason lies in the ongoing political chessboard of Manipur. The renewed Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement with Kuki-Zomi armed groups, the push for a Union Territory (UT) by Kuki-Zomi groups and their political fronts, the insistence on Manipur’s territorial integrity and unity by Meiteis and other communities, and the imposition of President’s Rule in February 2025 all complicate the government’s willingness to let the inquiry report see the light of day.

The commission’s report is not merely a record of facts. It is, in effect, a political document whose release – or delay – has direct implications for New Delhi’s management of a state on the edge.

A Conflict Frozen in Buffer Zones

The violence that erupted on May 3, 2023, began with the “Tribal Solidarity March” spearheaded by All Tribal Students’ Union, Manipur (ATSUM) against the demand for Scheduled Tribe status of Meiteis by the Scheduled Tribe Demand Committee of Manipur (STDCM) and Meetei (Meitei) Tribe Union (MTU). What followed was an orgy of arson, killings, and displacement across Churachandpur, Bishnupur, Kangpokpi, Moreh, Imphal East, Imphal West, and eventually even Jiribam.

Today, the scars are not just physical but territorial. Central Security Forces’ enforcement of “buffer zones” between the Central Valley and the Kuki-Zomi dominated areas of hill districts has ossified into a near-permanent separation. For Meiteis, the Central Valley resembles a cage, cut off from NH-2 and NH-37 lifelines. For the Kuki-Zomi groups, the buffer zone is a shield to consolidate their separatist politics. Many Nagas, meanwhile, see both Meitei’s position and Kuki-Zomi project as threats to their own aspiration for Nagalim.

This frozen conflict ensures that the Inquiry Commission is not simply investigating the past; it is reporting on a present that is still highly combustible. Any findings on lapses, culpability, or systemic failures could tip the fragile balance.

Why the Report Keeps Getting Deferred

1. Political Sensitivities of the SoO Agreement

The renewal of the Suspension of Operations (SoO) pact in September 2025 – after months of backchannel talks – is central to the delay. The Kuki-Zo armed groups under Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and United People’s Front (UPF) remain under the SoO framework, operating from designated camps. Their demand for a Union Territory carved out of hill districts runs parallel to their armed presence.

If the commission were to release a report indicting these groups for orchestrated violence, or exposing lapses in State complicity, it could derail the SoO extension and push the groups back into open militancy. Conversely, if the report emphasizes lapses by “majoritarian” state machinery, it risks inflaming valley sentiments, where “coexistence within Manipur” remains a near-universal demand.

Thus, the MHA finds it easier to buy time rather than risk destabilizing either constituency.

2. The UT Demand and Delhi’s Dilemma

The Kuki-Zomi political narrative has consolidated around the demand for a Union Territory under Central administration. The Kuki-Zo Council (KZC) frames this as a protective measure against “majoritarian” Meitei politics. The renewal of SoO indirectly legitimises their political agency.

But the Central Valley – across Meiteis, Pangals (Manipuri Muslims), and even smaller tribal groups – rejects partition. So do the Nagas, who fear that a Kuki-Zomi exclusive UT will overlap with lands they claim for Nagalim.

Any report that formally documents how the violence unfolded could either strengthen or weaken the UT demand. For New Delhi, postponing the report keeps options open – allowing it to negotiate with all sides without being boxed in by the Commission’s conclusions.

3. President’s Rule and Political Accountability

With President’s Rule imposed on February 13, 2025, and the Manipur Assembly placed under suspended animation, the inquiry’s findings carry even higher stakes. If the report were to expose grave lapses by the previous Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government of Chief Minister Nongthombam Biren Singh, questions would inevitably follow about why New Delhi allowed him to remain in office for twenty one months after the violence broke out.

Equally, if Central Security Forces’ lapses are documented, as many witnesses have alleged, it could damage the credibility of the MHA itself. By delaying the report, the ministry shields itself from direct accountability, especially ahead of possible decisions on restoring BJP’s elected government.

4. Incomplete Testimonies and Evidence-Gathering

Another practical reason is that the Commission’s work has been hampered by the geography of division. Displaced persons are scattered across camps in both valley and hills. Many victims cannot safely cross “buffer zones” to depose.

Arson sites or villages, destroyed buildings or police stations, and looted armouries complicate evidence collection. The inquiry’s mandate to probe administrative lapses is nearly impossible to complete without candid testimonies from security officials – who, given ongoing service or political affiliations, may be reluctant.

Thus, repeated extensions are justified as “operational necessities” even as political compulsions loom larger.

5. Election Calculus and Timing

The tenure of the Manipur Assembly runs until 2027. A damning report could polarize the electorate further, making free and fair polls difficult. With President’s Rule in place, New Delhi must at some point decide on restoring an elected government.

Delaying the report allows the Central Government to sequence its release with political timing, after negotiations with SoO groups, after a partial return of normalcy, after restoration of elected government, or after fresh elections when responsibility can be safely diffused.

Reading the Delay

Each extension has followed the same formula: the Commission’s work is incomplete, evidence is complex; testimonies are pending. These are valid points – thousands remain displaced, and access to conflict sites is difficult.

But the pattern reveals more than logistics. Extensions are timed with political developments:

• November 2024 extension followed engaging SoO groups and their Kuki-Zomi groups.
• May 2025 extension came just after President’s Rule was imposed.

The report is being calibrated to politics, not to justice. The delay itself becomes a political tool – allowing Delhi to avoid premature commitments while managing an unstable state.

The Broader Context: Competing Narratives

Meiteis and the Call for Unity and Integrity

The Central Valley, home to Meiteis, Pangals, and other communities, is surrounded by hills dominated by Kuki-Zomi and Naga tribes. In theory, Central Security Forces maintain “buffer zones” to prevent clashes. In practice, these have become borders.

For Meiteis, the Central Valley feels like a cage. Highways NH-2 and NH-37, once lifelines, are blocked. Movement beyond the buffer zones is restricted. For Kuki-Zomi groups, these same zones function as shields, behind which their political project – the demand for a Union Territory – is consolidated.

For the valley population, the demand for a UT is seen as an attempt to partition Manipur. Civil society groups, including COCOMI, frame the crisis as externally sponsored and accuse the SoO groups of waging war under the cover of a ceasefire. To them, the inquiry report must not whitewash the violence as “clashes” but recognize it as a coordinated separatist bid Kuki-Zomis with their counterparts in Myanmar.

Releasing a report that fails to endorse this narrative could inflame protests in the Central Valley and harden distrust of New Delhi.

Kuki-Zomi Groups and the Politics of Victimhood

For Kuki-Zomi organizations, the crisis is a story of victimhood under a “majoritarian” State blaming the Meiteis for the violence. Their argument is that the violence proves coexistence is impossible, making a Union Territory not just desirable but necessary. The SoO renewal provides them legitimacy and bargaining power.

A commission report attributing equal or greater responsibility to Kuki-Zomi militants would weaken this carefully cultivated narrative. The delay, therefore, serves their interest too.

Naga Position: Silent Opposition

While Nagas have not been central actors in the violence, their strategic position is undeniable. The Isak-Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland – NSCN (IM) and Naga Hoho view Kuki-Zomi expansionism with suspicion. Any UT carved out of Kuki-Zomi dominated districts would overlap with Naga claims for Nagalim. They quietly welcome the delay, which prevents legitimization of Kuki-Zomi claims.

The Commission’s findings on territorial claims, displacement, and land conflict would directly affect the NSCN (IM)’s stake. New Delhi, aware of the delicacy of ongoing peace talks between the Government of India (GOI) and NSCN (IM), has little incentive to rush the report.

The Risk of a “Truth Too Dangerous”

At its core, the repeated extensions reflect the MHA’s calculation that truth, at this moment, is more dangerous than delay. A report that squarely blames militant groups risks pushing them out of SoO. A report that blames state forces, Arambai Tenggol and Meitei Leepun risks inflaming valley outrage. A report that balances both may satisfy neither side, fuelling fresh protests.

In contrast, indefinite postponement allows the Central Government to control the pace of negotiations, manage law and order through President’s Rule, and wait for a more opportune political moment.

Consequences of Delay

But delay is costly:

1. Erosion of Trust: For displaced families still in relief camps, repeated extensions signal abandonment. Justice delayed feels like justice denied.
2. Normalization of Division: Buffer zones harden into borders when no accountability is fixed. The sense of separation risks becoming permanent.
3. Loss of Institutional Credibility: The Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952, is designed for timely probes. Repeated extensions reduce commissions to symbolic exercises, undermining faith in judicial accountability.
4. Risk of Radicalization: Communities perceiving the state as indifferent may turn further toward armed solutions. This is particularly dangerous when SoO camps double as political command centres.

Future Scenarios: Delay versus Disclosure

The fate of the Ajai Lamba Commission’s report is not just about deadlines – it is about which future Manipur, and indeed New Delhi, is willing to live with. Three metaphorical scenarios stand out:

Frozen Conflict: A State in Permanent Limbo

If the report continues to be postponed beyond November 2025, Manipur risks settling into a chilling equilibrium – neither peace nor war – but a “frozen conflict.”

• Borders Disguised as Buffers: The so-called buffer zones solidify into permanent boundaries, splitting the Central Valley and the Kuki-Zomi-dominated hills into parallel, disconnected geographies.
• Relief Camps as Ghettos: For the 61,000 displaced, Internally Displaced People’s camps or new relocated state-sponsored housing colonies become permanent addresses without returning to their own homes or villages, breeding hopelessness and alienation.
• Justice as Mirage: Each extension signals to victims that New Delhi has abandoned them, eroding faith in institutions and judicial accountability.
• Radicalization’s Return: Disillusionment drives both valley and Kuki-Zomi dominated hills toward armed strength rather than dialogue, laying foundations for renewed open militancy.

In this scenario, Manipur risks becoming India’s Bosnia – a landscape of enforced separation, where violent conflict is suspended but never resolved.

Firestorm of Truth: When the Report is Finally Released

If the Commission does deliver its findings in November 2025, disclosure itself would be an earthquake. The fault lines are already drawn – the fallout will depend on where the blame lands.

• If Kuki-Zomi Militants are Blamed: The SoO pact could collapse overnight. Armed groups may abandon ceasefire camps. Valley opinion would be vindicated, but the Kuki-Zomi dominated hills could ignite in fury.
• If State Forces, Arambai Tenggol, and Meitei Leepun are Blamed: Imphal would erupt in anger, accusing New Delhi of scapegoating valley communities. Trust in Central Security Forces would fray, complicating governance under President’s Rule.

• If Both Sides are Equally Blamed: An attempted balance may satisfy no one. Both valley and Kuki-Zomi communities could accuse the Centre of whitewashing. The report could deepen polarization rather than heal it.

• If Recommendations Push Reconciliation: This is the most optimistic outcome. If the report proposes credible mechanisms for rehabilitation, accountability, and political dialogue – and if New Delhi acts on them swiftly – it could restore some faith in institutions. But this requires political courage that New Delhi has so far avoided deliberately.

In every scenario, the truth itself risks becoming combustible. Naming guilt in Manipur is not a healing act but a spark – one capable of setting the State alight in a fresh cycle of unrest.

A Narrow Bridge to Reconciliation: Truth with a Plan

The most optimistic, though least likely, scenario is that the report does more than apportion blame. If it couples hard truths with a roadmap – compensation packages, rehabilitation schemes, mechanisms for disarmament, and a clear rejection of partition – it could form a fragile bridge between communities.

• For Victims: Recognition and restitution could restore faith that justice is still possible.
• For Communities: Clear lines on territorial integrity could silence separatist projects, while opening space for “local autonomy”.
• For New Delhi: Acting on the report would demonstrate political courage, showing that truth is not feared but harnessed for peace.

But this requires New Delhi to do what it has so far resisted: pair disclosure with decisive political will. Without such a plan, the bridge remains too narrow, and the truth may collapse under its own weight.

The Uncomfortable Choice

Between these three paths – Frozen Conflict, Firestorm of Truth, and A Narrow Bridge to Reconciliation – the MHA must choose. Delay buys time but deepens mistrust. Disclosure risks fire but also holds the possibility of healing. The choice is not between comfort and discomfort; it is between slow decay and risky repair.

Bottom Line

The Commission of Inquiry was meant to deliver clarity and accountability. Instead, it has become a political instrument, its deadlines extended to protect negotiations, shield New Delhi from blame, and postpone hard choices.

The MHA sees danger in the truth – and safety in delay. But the costs of this strategy are mounting. For the displaced, justice is denied. For communities, mistrust deepens. For Manipur, unity itself is at risk.

The tragedy of Manipur is not just the violence of May 3, 2023. It is also the silence of the state, almost two and half years later, when truth is still treated as a fire too dangerous to ignite, a bridge too narrow to cross, and a conflict easier to freeze than to resolve.

Conclusion: Extensions as a Political Strategy

The Union Ministry of Home Affairs has, in effect, converted the Commission of Inquiry into a political instrument – extending deadlines not because the work cannot be completed, but because the timing of its conclusions could destabilize the delicate balance in Manipur.

The present context – renewed SoO, Kuki-Zomi UT demand, Meitei insistence on Manipur’s unity and integrity, Naga opposition to Kuki claims, and governance under President’s Rule – means that any report will have immediate and explosive consequences.

Thus, for New Delhi, the safest option is to keep extending. Delay becomes strategy. Truth becomes negotiable. And the people of Manipur remain caught in suspended justice, where closure is always promised but never delivered.