Two thousand years back in the West, scholars, and also the public in general, have denounced the subjectivity of truth. When discourses are being generated in the context of public welfare, the ultimate necessity of objectivity arises. This is neither a case of optimization, nor a case of favorability, but a matter of connotated sense that deserves to be elevated at the highest level of mandatory-ness. When a bit of dilution occurs, it is never the sense of implication to certain moderation or mediocrity, but a gross mistake that will hinder the welfare of the public in all its aspects.
Now, in case of the morality, or public morality in general, the question of objectivity plunges itself into dilemmas, that might result in hijacking the fundamental truths necessary to sustain the sublime civilisational characters. This ‘may be’ is a negative possibility. What it portends is that the choice between the forking dilemmas could initially or finally favour the narcissism, above all other grander possibilities. Again, if the choice is reinforced by friends and peer groups, then the consequence becomes a compelling, and an imposing truth. More seriously, it emerges out to be a chauvinistic stance whose rationale is purely founded on the peer group pressure, or other external pressure, immune to the characteristics and functionality of morality in general, and the objectivity of the truths.
Morality is necessarily and, more appropriately, should be founded on the edicts of rationality and its corresponding objectivity. If one, or a group, is confused with the notion of objectivity in the context of morality, then they are prone to become liabilities in the days to come. In the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant made a grand celebration of morality and its foundation, or origin, in such a way that it cast its shadow even in the philosophical foundation of human rights projected and enshrined in the United Nations’ Declaration. Kant insisted that morality, or the question of what is right, is a product of moral rational will, where any actions must be some kind of maxim which can be universalize in such a way that if it is acted upon some man, every man must be considered to be an end in itself. This is neither a product of influential number game, nor it is base on consequentialist outlook, but a product of pure reasoning base on humanity. Hence the Declaration is based on the deontic terms that is inclined towards humanity. This does not allude to any kind anthropocentrism, but rather being humane is extensive towards the very prerogatives of the Nature.
The notion of preciousness of life, these days, is becoming religious. Following this current trend, all we can utter now, as a life-saving trend, is the rights of man. And when this rights of man comes down to the right to life, then any argument that resists and violates it, is deem to become an inhuman argument. Similarly, when a person engaging in a life saving profession begins to argue that people die because it is natural, and their hands are clean on the matter, is also at the same time saying that our profession is nominal, and the effectiveness of it lies in the hands of the God. As a matter of fact, all untimely deaths are simply our incapability. Terminal sicknesses are terminal simply because we are yet to overcome the advance nature of that particular sickness. While an advice to consume two litres of water every day, is also a life-saving advice in the long run, and a prescription of a simple pill still saves life, but to our conviction, it is not similar to a professional civil architect designing a structure. The point is, here the responsibility that is being implied is towards life, or the right to life, and more appropriately the treatment of man as an end in itself, which in turn belongs to the highest form of morality, or morality in its ultimate sense. Now when a responsible person, instead of realising one’s responsibility, begins to display arrogancy, then the outcome is highly undetermined. An ease to the rigidity could be attain if one simply admits that there are people who are incapable of dealing with such complexities. There can be only two options for the accuse for an informal bail. First, one readily admits the incapability either from personal point of view, or general point of view. Second, one apologizes for the glitches and discrepancies that took place in handling the situations. Historical evidences repeatedly proves that violators of the right to life ends up in a very pitiful situation legally. The Nazis and their commitment to Adolf Hitler’s anti-life policies were supported by some solid arguments, recalling and imbibing the ethos of nationalism. If few people adopted such ideological standards, then the dialectical antithesis will emerge like an uninvited tempest.
Violations of morality in public domain is also becoming a vogue. And there are avenues with the help of which such violations could be justified. This happens because most people get themselves repeatedly confused between the standards of morality. A series of theoretical standards can be laid down which are categorical in nature, and hardly there are points where they are concurrent. But none of them desists the primordiality of the right to life. There may be two squabbling moral standards, and their arguments might manifest and pervade in multiple directions, but in the end, somehow, they converge on the point where there is humanity, or on the case of being humane.
Therefore, people involving in life saving profession, must necessarily enhance their standards from simply doing egotistical duties to something deontological, where life of every man is being treated as an end in itself, and not some kind of collateral damage that comes up in one’s line of duty. And if you have your own perspectives to justify, other than the compliance to saving lives, then you are reviving sophism in an arena where its irrelevancy is at its peak. We are having instances for these kinds of situations where people argue, in defence of themselves, even in the case of their own perceptible flaws, not being apologetic in any sense, but in the sense of overriding the entire moral responsibility pertaining to most basic human rights. This is like demanding a special power act which can held and interrogate a person in the absence of a warrant.
When reason got itself defiled by the hedonistic urge, one gets truly blind to the objectivity and universality of morality. This situation further escalates in the denigration of duties towards humanity. A slight deviation from the imperatives of regarding man as an end in itself and not as a means, might distort one’s actions in public affairs, and behave like a tyrant in all its attempt to defend oneself from the arising allegations and accusations.
The writer is Assistant Professor, Imphal College
