The gunfire that emanated from Khamenlok on the night of December 9, 2025—on the eve of President Droupadi Murmu’s maiden visit to Manipur – was not merely an act of provocation. Nor was the December 16 attack on Meitei settlements in Phougakchao Ikhai and Torbung areas an isolated lapse of security. These incidents, occurring amidst heightened security alerts, presidential visits, Delhi-level tripartite negotiations with Kuki-Zomi militant groups, and fragile resettlement efforts for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), expose a deeper and more disturbing reality – the persistence of armed Kuki–Zomi militancy as a tolerated, rationalised, and politically leveraged phenomenon within India’s constitutional order.
More troubling than the firing itself is the fact that it continues to occur with near-impunity, often followed not by condemnation but by justification – most starkly in the December 17, 2025 press release of the Kuki-Zo Council (KZC), which defended the attack by invoking “buffer zones” and framing the resettlement of Meitei IDPs as a provocation. This raises two fundamental questions that strike at the heart of governance, sovereignty, and citizenship in Manipur – Why are Kuki–Zomi militants still able to fire on Meitei settlements despite an overwhelming security presence? And why is such violence repeatedly justified – sometimes indirectly legitimised – by influential Kuki-Zo community and political bodies?
To answer these questions requires moving beyond surface-level explanations of “law and order failure” and confronting the political architecture that has enabled armed coercion to become a bargaining tool for exclusivist ethnocentric identity politics in Manipur’s violent conflict that started on May 3, 2023 in Churachandpur.
Violence Amidst Presidential Security: A Symbolic Defiance of the State
That Kuki-Zomi militants reportedly fired rounds in Khamenlok while security arrangements were being intensified for the President of India’s visit is symbolically significant. Presidential visits in India are among the highest security exercises undertaken by the state, involving central armed police forces, intelligence coordination, and territorial domination protocols. Violence under such circumstances is not accidental; it is demonstrative.
The message conveyed was unmistakable, – armed Kuki-Zomi groups retain both capacity and confidence to operate even when the Indian state is at its most vigilant. This is not simply a failure of intelligence or policing – it reflects a deeper hesitation to decisively confront Kuki-Zomi armed actors who are simultaneously being engaged politically by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).
The contradiction could not be more glaring. While President Murmu was physically present in Manipur, the MHA was in dialogue with Kuki-Zomi militant groups represented by their two umbrella groups – Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and United People’s Front (UPF) – who are under the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement in Delhi on December 12, 2025. Following the talks, these groups reiterated an uncompromising demand – reintegration within Manipur was “no longer possible,” and a Union Territory with legislature remained the “only solution.”
The optics are deeply corrosive to public faith. On the ground, Meitei civilians face bullets and bombs and cannot move on the two National Highways – NH-2 and NH-37. In Delhi, the Kuki-Zomi militant groups sit across the table from the Union government as political interlocutors in presence of the State government as well.
The Torbung Attacks: Targeting Rehabilitation as a Political Strategy
The December 16 attacks on Phougakchao Ikhai and Torbung in Bishnupur district by the Kuki-Zomi militants from the bordering areas of Churachandpur district marks a particularly dangerous escalation, not only because of its timing – hours after a security review meeting of the Churachandpur district by the State Director General of Police (DGP) – but because of its target – resettled Meitei IDPs.
Just a day earlier, 389 Meitei IDPs from 97 families had returned to their villages after almost three years in relief camps. Of the total returnees, 187 are male and 202 are female. Their return was not spontaneous or defiant; it was part of a phased rehabilitation programme flagged off by the district administration, with explicit assurances of security. These families returned to Phougakchao Ikhai, Torbung, and other villages believing the state was finally reclaiming its constitutional duty.
The firing shattered that belief.
By attacking within 24 hours of resettlement, militants sent a clear signal – rehabilitation without Kuki-Zomi consent will be punished. The violence was not random; it was strategic. It aimed to render rehabilitation unviable, to demonstrate that the writ of the Manipur government does not extend into so-called “buffer zones,” and to instil fear sufficient to trigger secondary displacement.
This is where the question of “why Kuki-Zomi militants are allowed to fire” becomes inseparable from why rehabilitation itself has become hostage to armed veto.
Buffer Zones: From Temporary Security Measure to De Facto Borders
As discussed many a times by the author in earlier articles, at the centre of the Kuki-Zo Council’s justification lies the concept of the “buffer zone,” particularly the so-called Torbung buffer zone. Originally introduced as a temporary confidence-building measure by the Central Security Forces to prevent direct clashes, buffer zones have gradually mutated into de facto borders, enforced asymmetrically and interpreted politically.
In theory, buffer zones are neutral spaces under strict state control. In practice, they have functioned as exclusionary regimes, restricting Meitei movement while consolidating Kuki-Zomi armed dominance in surrounding hill tracts and foot hills areas. When Meitei IDPs are resettled in their own ancestral villages, the act is framed not as restoration of citizenship but as “provocation.”
This inversion is extraordinary. Victims of ethnic cleansing are portrayed as aggressors. Rehabilitation is reframed as violation. And the state, instead of asserting constitutional clarity, often responds with silence, ambiguity, or calls for “restraint on both sides.”
The Kuki-Zo Council’s December 17 press release exemplifies this moral inversion. By blaming the Deputy Commissioner of Bishnupur for “irresponsibility” and accusing Meiteis of acting provocatively during the Christmas season, the KZC positioned armed retaliation as a defensive necessity rather than an act of terror.
Such rhetoric does not merely justify violence; it normalises armed ethnic veto over civilian governance.
The Separate Administration Demand and the Logic of Coercion
The insistence on a Separate Administration or Union Territory is not merely a political aspiration; it has become an organising logic for violence. While the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has publicly rejected the demand as “not favourable,” its continued engagement with armed militant groups that make this demand central has created a dangerous ambiguity.
From the militants’ perspective, violence serves multiple functions. It demonstrates territorial control. It pressures the state by destabilising “normalcy” narratives. And crucially, it reinforces the claim that coexistence within Manipur is impossible.
Every attack on Meitei settlements, every disruption of rehabilitation, feeds into a self-fulfilling argument – that integration has failed coexistence has failed, and separation is inevitable.
The December 12 Delhi talks, held while the President was visiting Manipur, underscore this contradiction. While BJP national leadership summoned its MLAs of Manipur Legislative Assembly which has been under Suspended Animation since February 13, 2025 and urged them to “bring peace and normalcy” before considering restoration of an elected government, armed groups were telling the Centre that reintegration was off the table altogether.
The result is paralysis. The state government cannot act decisively without Delhi’s backing. Delhi hesitates to act decisively for fear of derailing talks or otherwise. Militants exploit this hesitation to consolidate facts on the ground.
Impunity, SoO, and the Collapse of Accountability
A critical factor enabling continued militant firing is the erosion of the SoO framework. Reportedly designed to reduce violence and create space for dialogue, the SoO regime has increasingly functioned as a shield against accountability allowing other non-SoO Kuki-militant armed groups floated and act advantageously.
Armed cadres are said to remain in designated camps and weapons are also said to be stored in safe rooms under double locking system within designated camps identified by the government (both central and state) and monitored by security forces while some arms and ammunitions are still allowed to be possessed by the militants for their safety and security, yet arms even including sophisticated weapons continue to surface in attacks against Meiteis. Reportedly, intelligence inputs are rarely followed by decisive action. Arrests, when made, are often temporary or symbolic.
The absence of consequences sends a powerful message – violence carries no cost.
This impunity is compounded by selective enforcement. After the Kuki-Zomi militants attacked on Meitei settlements in Torbung and Phougakchao Ikhai areas from the surrounding areas of Churachandpur district, heavy security measures, combing operations, and frisking of civilians are evident in Imphal valley. While Meitei civilians face movement restrictions, vehicle checks, and arrests under preventive laws, Kuki-Zomi militants who violate ceasefire norms face little more than condemnations. This asymmetry fuels resentment and deepens perceptions of state bias.
The question is no longer whether the state lacks capacity, but whether it lacks political will.
Community Bodies as Political Shields for Militancy
The role of the Kuki-Zo Council (KZC) or Committee on Tribal Unity (COTU) and similar bodies must be examined critically. Kuki-Zomi community organisations are entitled to political advocacy. But when they issue statements that justify armed attacks on Meitei civilian settlements, they cross a dangerous line.
By providing ideological cover, such bodies transform militant violence into “community defence.” This blurring of civilian and militant roles complicates counter-insurgency responses and makes accountability politically sensitive.
It also internationalises the narrative. Claims of provocation, buffer zone violations, and victimhood are increasingly framed in human rights language, even as civilians are targeted. This rhetorical strategy seeks to pre-empt state action by casting it as repression.
In effect, militancy is laundered through civil discourse.
Frozen Conflict and the Illusion of Normalcy
The BJP national leadership’s instruction to its MLAs of a suspended animation assembly to work towards “peace and normalcy” before forming an elected government reveals another uncomfortable truth – Manipur, which has been under President’s Rule since February 13, 2025, is being governed under a paradigm of frozen conflict.
Violence is not resolved; it is managed. “Buffer Zones” or De facto Borders are not dismantled; they are enforced. Displacement is not reversed; it is administered.
Under such conditions, attacks like those in Khamenlok in the border areas of Kangpokpi district and Imphal East district, and Torbung and Phougakchao Ikhai areas in Bishnupur district bordering Churachandpur district are not aberrations – they are pressure releases within a controlled instability.
For Meitei IDPs, this means perpetual uncertainty. Rehabilitation becomes conditional, reversible, and contingent on militant acquiescence. The promise to close relief camps by year-end rings hollow when returnees are forced to flee again.
Citizenship, Territory, and the Crisis of the Indian State
At its core, the question of why Kuki–Zomi militants are allowed to fire on Meiteis is a question about whose citizenship the Indian state is willing to defend unconditionally.
When armed groups can dictate where citizens may live, when district administrations are accused of provocation for restoring displaced families, and when violence is met with justification rather than justice, the constitutional promise of equality collapses further.
The justification offered by the Kuki-Zo Council reveals a deeper ideological shift – from coexistence within a plural state to ethnic territorial sovereignty enforced by arms. As long as this shift is indulged – politically, rhetorically, or strategically – violence will remain a tool, not a tragedy.
Conclusion: Ending the Politics of Justified Violence
The events of December 2025 expose a grim reality. Kuki–Zomi militants continue to fire on Meitei settlements not because the state is absent, but because it is conflicted – caught between enforcing sovereignty and managing negotiations. The Kuki-Zo Council justifies such violence because it aligns with a broader political project that treats armed coercion as legitimate leverage.
Peace cannot emerge from such contradictions. Rehabilitation cannot succeed under armed veto. And coexistence cannot be negotiated at gunpoint.
Until the Indian state unequivocally asserts that no political demand severing Manipur – however articulated – can be pursued through violence, Manipur will remain trapped in a cycle where victims are blamed, militants are indulged, and normalcy is endlessly deferred.
What is at stake is not merely peace in Manipur, but the credibility of constitutional governance itself.
Senior Editor: Imphal Review of Arts and Politics
