The April 22, 2026 notification issued by the Manipur Home Department – empowering officers not below the rank of Head Constable/Havildar as “Designated Authority” under Section 43A of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) – must be situated within the layered, prolonged, and deeply fractured conflict that has gripped Manipur since May 3, 2023. The context is not merely one of insurgency or sporadic violence; it is one of systemic breakdown, competing sovereignties, and a crisis of legitimacy. Against this backdrop, the notification raises profound legal, political, and human rights questions that cannot be reduced to administrative necessity alone.
At its core, Section 43A of UAPA enables designated officers to arrest, search, and seize without warrant based on “reason to believe” that an offence under the Act has been or is about to be committed. Traditionally, such powers – given their extraordinary nature – are vested in relatively senior officers to ensure accountability and restraint. The Manipur Home Department notification marks a significant departure – by extending these powers down to the level of Head Constables and Havildars, it effectively decentralizes coercive authority to the lowest operational tiers of policing. In a conflict zone already saturated with overlapping security laws and forces, this shift is neither minor nor technical – it is structural.
To understand the implications, one must first examine the long-standing criticisms of UAPA itself. Over the past decade, UAPA has increasingly been characterized as India’s primary anti-terror legislation, but also as a law prone to misuse. Its broad definitions of “unlawful activity” and “terrorist act,” combined with stringent bail provisions, particularly Section 43D(5), create conditions where arrest often translates into prolonged pre-trial incarceration. Though conviction rates under UAPA remain relatively low, but the process itself becomes punitive. Human rights organizations, legal scholars, and even sections of the judiciary have raised concerns that UAPA is frequently invoked not only against terrorists and armed militants but also against activists, journalists, students, and dissenters.
In this sense, the “misuse” of UAPA is not always about overt illegality; it is embedded in the architecture of the law itself. The threshold for suspicion is low, the safeguards are limited, and the consequences of being charged are severe. When such a law is implemented in a conflict-ridden state like Manipur – where information is contested, identities are politicised, and violence is often ethnocentric and retaliatory – the risk of wrongful targeting multiplies.
It is precisely here that the intervention of the Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEVFAM) vs. Union of India becomes critically relevant. In this landmark case, the Supreme Court of India examined allegations of 1,528 extrajudicial killings in Manipur, many of them carried out in the context of counter-insurgency operations under AFSPA. The Court categorically rejected the notion that a “war-like situation” or the existence of insurgency could justify the use of excessive or retaliatory force. It held that even in disturbed areas, the use of force must be subject to the rule of law, and every encounter resulting in death must be independently investigated. The Court emphasized that there is “no concept of absolute immunity” for state actors and that the right to life under Article 21 remains non-derogable.
This judicial intervention fundamentally altered the legal discourse on state violence in Manipur. It exposed patterns of impunity, questioned the routine justification of “encounter killings,” and reaffirmed that extraordinary laws do not create zones of exception outside constitutional scrutiny. The relevance of this case to the present notification is profound – it underscores the dangers of expanding coercive powers without simultaneously strengthening accountability mechanisms. If even highly trained armed forces operating under AFSPA were found to have engaged in unlawful killings, the risks associated with extending similar operational latitude to lower-ranking police personnel under UAPA become even more acute.
The comparison with the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 is both inevitable and instructive. AFSPA grants sweeping powers to the armed forces in “disturbed areas,” including the authority to use lethal force, arrest without warrant, and search premises. Crucially, it also provides legal immunity to personnel, requiring prior sanction from the Central government for prosecution. AFSPA has long been criticized for enabling a culture of impunity, particularly in the Northeast and Jammu & Kashmir.
However, there are important distinctions between AFSPA and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. AFSPA, 1958 is territorially bound and institution-specific – it applies to armed forces operating in designated areas of the Northeast only. UAPA, by contrast, is a nationwide law applicable to all individuals and enforced primarily by police and investigative agencies. AFSPA is about military control in disturbed areas; UAPA is about criminalizing certain acts and associations across the country.
Yet, the Manipur notification blurs this distinction. By empowering lower-ranking police personnel with quasi-AFSPA-like powers under UAPA, the state appears to be extending the logic of militarised governance into the domain of civilian policing. This raises a critical question – is the intention to create parity between police powers under UAPA and military powers under AFSPA?
If so, the implications are troubling. AFSPA, for all its controversies, operates within a chain of command that is relatively centralized and disciplined. The armed forces are trained for conflict scenarios, and their actions – though often opaque – are subject to internal military protocols. In contrast, the police force, especially at lower ranks, operates under different conditions – limited training in counterinsurgency, high exposure to local pressures, and varying levels of institutional oversight. Empowering Head Constables and Havildars with such extraordinary powers risks not only misuse but also inconsistency and arbitrariness in enforcement. The lessons from the EEVFAM case serve as a cautionary precedent – when lethal or coercive powers are normalized without strict oversight, they tend to produce systemic abuse rather than targeted security outcomes.
This brings us to the question of precedent. Are Head Constables or Havildars designated authorities under UAPA in other states? The answer, broadly, is NO – at least not as a matter of routine policy. While Section 43A allows for flexibility in designation, most states have exercised caution, typically restricting such powers to officers of the rank of Sub-Inspector or above. The rationale is clear – the gravity of the powers demands a corresponding level of experience, training, and accountability.
Manipur’s decision, therefore, stands out as exceptional. It reflects either a perceived urgency that overrides conventional safeguards or a deeper shift in governance strategy – one that prioritises operational reach over institutional restraint.
But what is this urgency? Is the notification aimed at countering genuine terror activities –such as the killings in Tronglaobi, TM Kasom, or Jiribam or similar incidents? There is no doubt that Manipur has witnessed heinous acts of violence against civilians, including women and children. The brutality of these incidents demands a robust response from the state. From this perspective, expanding the pool of officers empowered to act under UAPA could be seen as an attempt to enhance responsiveness and deterrence.
However, this explanation is only partially convincing. The effectiveness of counter-terror operations depends not merely on the number of empowered personnel but on intelligence, coordination, and legitimacy. In a deeply divided society, where different communities perceive the state through different lenses, the indiscriminate use of coercive powers can exacerbate alienation rather than restore order. The Supreme Court’s scrutiny in the 1,528 killings case demonstrates that excessive reliance on force – without credible accountability – ultimately delegitimises the state’s security narrative.
This leads to the second possibility – that the notification is aimed at controlling or suppressing democratic mobilization in the Imphal Valley. The valley has witnessed sustained protests, civil society activism, and political assertions since the onset of the conflict. While these movements are largely non-violent, the broad ambit of UAPA allows for their potential criminalization. By lowering the threshold for enforcement, the state may be equipping itself with tools to pre-empt or contain dissent.
Such a trajectory would align with broader national patterns, where UAPA has been invoked in contexts that are not strictly terror-related. The danger here is not hypothetical. In a climate of fear and polarisation, the line between “security threat” and “political opposition” can become blurred. Empowering lower-ranking officers to make such determinations on the ground introduces a high risk of overreach.
A third interpretation is that the notification reflects the state’s diminishing capacity to control the situation through conventional and democratic means. As argued in my earlier analyses, Manipur is experiencing a form of “managed federalism,” where the state government operates within constraints imposed by central agencies and security imperatives. In such a scenario, the decentralization of coercive power may be less about strategy and more about desperation – a way to compensate for institutional fragmentation and loss of control.
This interpretation is reinforced by the coexistence of UAPA and AFSPA in the state. While AFSPA has been partially withdrawn from certain police station jurisdictions in the Imphal Municipal Areas since 2004, it continues to operate in the rest of Manipur. The result is a complex legal landscape where different areas are governed by different regimes of force. The April 2026 notification adds another layer to this complexity, potentially extending extraordinary powers into areas where AFSPA is not in force.
This raises a fundamental question about the nature of governance in Manipur today. Is the state moving towards a unified, law-based approach to security, or is it deepening a patchwork of overlapping authorities that undermine clarity and accountability?
From a human rights perspective, the concerns are stark. The combination of UAPA’s preventive detention framework and the operational latitude granted by Section 43A creates conditions ripe for abuse. Arbitrary arrests, prolonged detention without trial, custodial violence, and lack of transparency are not abstract risks – they are documented realities in many conflict zones. When such powers are extended to a broader set of actors without commensurate safeguards, the scale of potential violations increases. The findings and observations in the EEVFAM case of 1528 serve as a stark reminder that impunity, once embedded, becomes systemic and self-reinforcing.
Moreover, the psychological impact on the population cannot be ignored. In a society already traumatised by violence, the perception that any lower-ranking officer can arrest or search without warrant may deepen fear and mistrust. This, in turn, undermines the very objective of restoring normalcy and confidence in the rule of law, and will deepen the trust deficit between the State and the public.
None of this is to deny the reality of armed violence in Manipur. Insurgent groups, militant formations, and armed actors across communities have committed serious crimes. The state has a duty to protect its citizens and to act against those who perpetrate violence. But the means matter as much as the ends. A security-centric approach that relies heavily on extraordinary laws and expanded coercive powers risks becoming self-defeating if it erodes legitimacy and fuels further grievances.
The critical issue, therefore, is not whether UAPA should be implemented in Manipur, but how. Implementation must be guided by principles of necessity, proportionality, and accountability. This includes clear guidelines on the use of powers, robust oversight mechanisms, and avenues for redress. It also requires political engagement, dialogue, and efforts to address the underlying causes of the conflict – precisely the kind of constitutional balance that the Supreme Court sought to restore in its intervention on extrajudicial killings.
In conclusion, the April 22, 2026 notification is more than an administrative measure – it is a window into the evolving logic of governance in Manipur. By empowering Head Constables and Havildars as designated authorities under UAPA, the state has taken a step that raises serious questions about human rights, institutional capacity, and the balance between security and liberty. The shadow of the 1,528 alleged extrajudicial killings – and the Supreme Court’s insistence on accountability – looms large over this decision. Whether this step contributes to peace or deepens the cycle of violence will depend not only on how the powers are used, but on whether they are embedded within a broader framework of accountability, justice, and political resolution.
Senior Editor: Imphal Review of Arts and Politics
