The constitutional transition of India from a British colony to an independent political identity took place in two distinct phases. First, during British suzerainty, from the proposed Federation of India under the Government of India Act, 1935 (GOI Act) up to the creation of the Dominion of India under the Indian Independence Act, 1947 (IIA). Second, from the Dominion of India in 1947 up to the establishment of the Union of India through the Constitution of India in 1950.
Manipur’s position in these transitions has remained one of the most neglected areas in regional constitutional scholarship. Re-examining this crucial historical trajectory is essential to understanding Manipur’s political and legal status during this period of transition. Certain strands of thought have the propensity to locate Manipur’s status within the larger constitutional framework of India without considering the records and instruments that bear particular historical and political relevance for Manipur. This essay is an attempt to clear that confusion. These analytical interpretations are carried out through a critical re-examination of legal instruments, records and international conventions in their historical and political contexts.
The term “State” or “Princely State” as used here, refers to those sovereign and independent kingdoms which predated colonial British administration and possessed international legal personality under the prevailing law of nations of the time, and not to the meaning of “State” as employed in Article 12 of India’s Constitution of 1950. “Dominion” here is used predominantly to mean the Dominion of India created under Section 1 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947.
Understanding Manipur’s Identity
The Indian Independence Act 1947 having received the royal assent on 18th July, 1947, had the force of law. Legally, as per Section 7 (1) (b) of IIA, British suzerainty over Princely States lapsed on this date. The sovereign status of States was restored (Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy, 12th May, 1946). Manipur’s sovereignty having been restored, it adopted its own Manipur Constitution on 26th July, 1947. This legal, historical and political fact is crucial in understanding the position of Manipur during India’s constitutional transition.
From Federation to Dominion Status: Two Statutes (1935–1947)
Two primary legal instruments of immense historical and political significance during this period were the Government of India Act, 1935 (GOI Act) and the Indian Independence Act, 1947.
In relation to the Princely States, two provisions of the GOI Act are important. First, the establishment of a Federation of India. Section 5(1) reads thus: “It shall be lawful for His Majesty, if an address in that behalf has been presented to him by each House of Parliament and if the condition hereinafter mentioned is satisfied, to declare by Proclamation that as from the day therein appointed there shall be united in a Federation under the Crown, by the name of the Federation of India…”. It sought to establish a Federation of India consisting of the Governor’s Provinces (British directly administered Provinces) and the Princely States. Chief Commissioners’ Provinces were also proposed to be included. The accession of the Princely States was optional, as per Section 5(1)(b), which reads thus: “the Indian States which have acceded or may thereafter accede to the Federation.”
Second, the Instrument of Accession. Section 6 provides for the mechanism of Instrument of Accession (IOA) by the Princely States to the federation. The proviso to Section 6(1) described its nature thus: “Provided that an Instrument of Accession may be executed conditionally on the establishment of the Federation on or before a specified date, and in that case the State shall not be deemed to have acceded to the Federation if the Federation is not established until after date”. Thus, accession by the States to the proposed Federation was conditional upon the establishment of the Federation. It was a conditional instrument that could have validity only with the establishment of the Federation. Signing an Instrument of Accession alone under the GOI Act does not amount to accession unless the proposed Federation came into force.
The Federation of India envisaged under this Act never came into being, as the Princely States never gave their consent. As no federation was established, it follows that there were no valid Instruments of Accession under that scheme. So, for the purpose of this analysis, Instrument of Accession means the instrument that was designed as adapted from the GOI Act, 1935 under the Indian Independence Act, 1947.
Now turning to the Indian Independence Act, 1947, Section 2(4) provides: “Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of subsection (3) of this section, nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing the accession of Indian States to either of the new Dominions”. It anticipated the accession of the Princely States to either of the Dominions—India or Pakistan—but did not make it mandatory. Accession to either Dominion was optional.
Operationality of the Government of India Act, 1935
Before examining the nature of the Accession Instrument, it must be noted that even after the Indian Independence Act, 1947 came into force on 15th August 1947, the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935 continued in operation until 25 January 1950. The Constitution of India came into effect on 26 January 1950.
Section 9 of the IIA allowed the Governor-General to adapt and modify existing laws, including the GOI Act, 1935, to implement the whole scheme of the IIA. Thus, the legal vacuum during the period between 15th August 1947 and 25th January 1950 was filled by the continued operation of the GOI Act, 1935.
Instrument of Accession: Two Different Purposes
Under the GOI Act, 1935, the IOA was devised as a mechanism for establishing a constitutional relationship between the proposed Federal Government of India and its federating Provinces and States, by way of vesting certain subjects in the Federal Legislature, which could then exercise law-making powers over such subjects.
The reference to accession in Section 2(4) of the IIA is different from the IOA as stipulated under the GOI Act, 1935. The Preamble of the IOA signed by Manipur’s Maharajah on 11th August 1947 underscored the constitutional nexus between the GOI Act and the IIA in so far as Manipur’s accession to the Indian Dominion was concerned. The GOI Act, 1935 was adapted and modified by the Governor-General of India under Section 9(c) of the IIA. The legality of the IOA as adapted by Governor-General Mountbatten is not the issue. The real issue is the intent and purpose of that adaptation. What the IOA under the GOI Act, 1935 sought to achieve was different from the adapted IOA under the IIA of 1947.
Accession under the GOI Act was meant to establish a Federation of India, and within that federation the Federal Legislature would have law-making authority over those subjects conferred by the States. It was not automatic, but conditional upon the establishment of the Federation, which never came to fruition. The adapted IOA under the IIA of 1947 was not for the establishment of a Federation of India. Rather, its sole purpose was to make the States transfer three crucial subject-matters—defence, external affairs and communications—to the Dominion of India, without any condition of a federal polity.
The Accession Instrument so adapted under the GOI Act, 1935 survived only as a transitional constitutional framework. It was a framework that emboldened the integrationist agenda to progressively destroy the identity and autonomy of the acceding States. This is where the adapted IOA becomes problematic for two reasons.
Federal Premise: A Failed Project
First, the object and purpose of accession as premised upon the original GOI Act was frustrated within the scheme of adaptation under the IIA. The IOA, as envisaged under the GOI Act, 1935, carried with it the legacy of a federal polity, which was defeated within the scheme of the IIA, 1947. The establishment of the “Union” of India in place of a Federation stands as historical testimony to this miscarriage. It reflected, rather, a deeper design within the Indian state-building project.
The Dominion Government of India manipulated the legacy of the IOA to persuade and convince the Princely States to join the Union of India, while guarantees for the preservation of their autonomy were progressively aborted, without their consent, through the mechanisms of State reorganisation and the abolition of Privy Purses. Accession within the scheme of the GOI Act, 1935 did not make the States surrender their full sovereignty to the Indian Dominion, nor did it commit them to accept the future Constitution of India.
There existed two common denominators of accession under the two legal frameworks: (a) it served as a mechanism to establish constitutional relations between the Federal/Dominion Government and the States, and (b) accession by the States was optional. The use of the words “…nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing the accession of Indian States” in Section 2(4) of the IIA made it clear that only if the States were willing to accede to either of the Dominions, such accession would be allowed or accepted.
Issue of Competence of Manipur’s Maharajah
Second, before Manipur’s Maharajah signed the Accession Instrument on 11th August 1947, Manipur had already, on 26th July 1947, become a sovereign constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy based on the British model under the Manipur Constitution Act. By virtue of this constitutional transformation, the executive authority was vested in the Council of Ministers under Section 10(a) of the Manipur Constitution. On the date of signing the Accession Instrument, the Maharajah was only the titular or constitutional head of State under Section 9(b). Manipur’s constitutional architecture did not support the validity of the Accession Instrument.
Section 6(1) of the GOI Act stood in as an antithesis to the principle of the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned when it stated that “A State shall be deemed to have acceded to the Federation if His Majesty has signified his acceptance of an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof…”. This stands against the principle of “consent of the governed” propounded by John Locke as early as 1690 in his Two Treatises of Government. Concluding an agreement with the rulers or princes alone, without consulting the peoples concerned, truly captured the positivist colonial governmentality of the British.
Transferring legislative authority by one State to another over subjects such as defence and external affairs is a matter of the gravest concern. These subjects are essential attributes of State sovereignty. Manipur’s sovereignty was not vested in the titular Maharajah but in the people of Manipur. The Manipur Constitution of 1947 testifies to this fact.
Section 3 of the Manipur Constitution constrained the rights, authority and jurisdiction of the Maharajah of Manipur. As these subjects concerned the legitimate interests of Manipur, he was constrained from making such a deal alone in his nominal capacity without consulting the Manipur Parliament. Section 8(a) of the Manipur Constitution provides: “The Maharajah’s Prerogatives shall not, however, be taken to comprise any matter wherein the legitimate interests of the [Manipur] State Administration … is involved”. Maharajah Bodhchandra did not have the constitutional authority to sign the Accession Instrument under the Manipur Constitution.
Rule of Invalidating Consent: Manifest Violation of Manipur Constitutional Law
Signing the Accession Instrument was in violation of the Manipur Constitution, which was in force at the time, and was done without competence. An agreement concluded without competence and in violation of a rule of a State’s constitutional law is not valid and is without legal consequence. Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 (VCLT) provides: “A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.”
The Manipur Constitution of 1947 was not imposed by the British Government. It was established in response to the popular demand for constitutional government, and the Constitution Drafting Committee was instituted under the supervision and with the active collaboration of Maharajah Bodhchandra. He was fully aware of his titular position as Head of the State under the Manipur Constitution. Acting with knowledge of the constitutional limitations imposed under Sections 8(a), 9(b) and 10(a) of the Manipur Constitution amounts to a violation that was manifest. These provisions constituted rules of internal law of fundamental importance to Manipur’s legal and political order as established in July 1947.
The Accession Instrument signed on 11th August 1947 by Maharajah Bodhchandra was therefore invalid. Acceptance of the Instrument by Governor-General Mountbatten on 16th August 1947 did not render it valid and binding. Many principles of the VCLT, 1969 —including pacta sunt servanda (Art. 26), consent to be bound by signature, ratification and acceptance (Arts. 11–17), material breach (Art. 60), invalidity by error, fraud, corruption and coercion (Arts. 46–53), and manifest violation of internal law of fundamental importance —have been accepted as reflecting customary international law. Agreements or treaties concluded in violation of these customary treaty-making norms are without validity and legal consequence. These are norms that had already influenced and shaped, or ought to have been respected by, sovereign independent States while concluding agreements and treaties. The VCLT in 1969 merely codified them and reaffirmed their foundational character in treaty-making.
From Accession to Taking Over: Merger Agreements
The IOA as adapted under the IIA, 1947 laid the foundation for establishing a constitutional relationship between the Dominion of India and the States. Once the Dominion of India secured the accession of the States through the IOA over three crucial subject-matters, the next step was to conclude Merger Agreements with the States (White Paper on Indian States, Ministry of States, Government of India, 1950). Thus, a series of Merger Agreements, hectic in nature, were concluded in 1948–1949 between the Dominion Government of India and the States.
The distinctive feature of the Merger Agreement was that it facilitated the transfer of full and exclusive rights and authority for the administration and governance of the States to the Dominion of India. Article 1 of the Merger Agreement concluded between Manipur and the Dominion Government of India on 21st September 1949 reads: “His Highness the Maharajah of Manipur hereby cedes to the Dominion Government full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the governance and agrees to transfer the administration of the State to the Dominion Government on the fifteenth day of October 1949… As from the said day the Dominion Government will be competent to exercise the said powers, authority and jurisdiction in such manner and through such agency as it may think fit”.
This was effectuated through the Manipur Administration Order dated 15 October 1949. It facilitated the unilateral dissolution of the Manipur Parliament and the taking over of the Government of Manipur by the Dominion Government of India by bypassing the constitutional process of the Manipur Constitution, 1947. Manipur became a Chief Commissioner’s Province under Major General Rawal Amar Singh.
Merger Agreement Legality: Assessment Parameters
The issues of legality surrounding the Merger Agreement are as important as those concerning the IOA. The parameters applied to assess the legality and validity of the IOA equally apply to the Merger Agreement. In assessing the legality of the Merger Agreement, ratification and people’s approval occupy a fundamental place. The Manipur Parliament, which was established through elections held in 1948 under the Manipur Constitution of 1947, never ratified the Merger Agreement. This is a historical and political fact. The people of Manipur never approved the Agreement. In October 1993, the people of Manipur, through a convention, denounced the Merger Agreement as invalid and without legal effect. The position of the people of Manipur on the Merger issue is crystal clear. There is no confusion. Counter-narratives to this position must establish their arguments through scientific research and evidence.
In addition to the grounds for holding the IOA signed by Maharajah Bodhchandra as invalid, one primary historical fact may be reproduced here to make clear the context of the illegality of the Merger Agreement. The telegram dated 18th September 1949 sent by Sri Prakasa, Governor of Assam, to V.P. Menon, then Secretary of the Ministry of States, Dominion Government of India, for Sardar Patel, the then Deputy Prime Minister of India, reads:
“HH [Maharajah Bodhchandra] must not under any circumstances be allowed to return to Manipur with his advisors and I have accordingly instructed police to detain here his party if they attempt to return before signing of agreement.
Please telegraph immediately repeat immediately authority for detention of HH and advisors under Regulation III or whatever other means you consider might be appropriate. Have already warned sub-area to be prepared for any eventuality in Manipur”.
Writings published by officials of the Manipur Government under the Manipur Constitution of 1947, who themselves witnessed the entire Merger episode at the Manipur Rajbari, Redlands, Shillong, corroborate the fact that Maharajah Bodhchandra and all members of his official team from Manipur were house-arrested and detained under the State Prisoners Regulation, 1818, also known as Regulation III. A British colonial law, Regulation III was in force in 1949 and authorised the detention of persons without judicial review who were considered threats to the Government of British India. The Dominion Government of India used this colonial law against Manipur in 1949 to obtain Maharajah Bodhchandra’s consent to the Merger Agreement. This attracts two customary norms of treaty-making which were later codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969.
First, Article 51 of the VCLT states: “The expression of a State’s consent to be bound by a treaty which has been procured by the coercion of its representatives through acts or threats directed against him shall be without any legal effect”. Second, Article 52 provides: “A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations”.
What these treaty-making norms mean is that if consent is obtained by threat or use of force, the agreement or treaty so concluded is invalid and without legal effect. A treaty concluded in violation of the principles of international law as laid down in the United Nations Charter is void. The fact that Maharajah Bodhchandra was forced to give his consent to the Merger Agreement violated Article 51 of the VCLT. The threat or use of force directed against him was contrary to the principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits threats or use of force against the political independence or territorial integrity of a State. The detention of Maharajah Bodhchandra under Regulation III, the deprivation of his freedom of communication and movement to consult his Council of Ministers, and the pressure brought upon him constituted the elements of threat and use of force contemplated under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This is further corroborated by the military preparedness of the Dominion Government of India in Manipur to suppress armed resistance against the Merger with India. The tests of Article 52 of the VCLT are fulfilled. India forced Manipur to sign the Merger Agreement. Hence, the Agreement is void.
States under the Union of India: The Constitution of India (1950)
From the transfer of three subjects under accession to the full cessation and transfer of authority, jurisdiction and powers to govern and administer Manipur, the decisive step was executed through the Merger Agreement. It achieved what the IOA could not. The IOA became the means through which the consolidation of States took place within the polity of the Dominion of India. The Merger Agreement consolidated Manipur within the Dominion of India.
However, the Agreement did not stipulate the type of political structure within which governance and administration were to be carried on, unlike the IOA under the GOI Act, 1935. Later, when the Constitution of India was adopted and enacted in 1949, India’s polity was established as a unitary system with certain quasi-federal features. Centralising features predominate in the structure of India’s Constitution. Article 1 of India’s Constitution established India as a Union of States, not as a Federation as had been envisaged under the GOI Act, 1935. Durga Das Basu remarked that India is an indestructible Union composed of destructible States, hinting at Parliament’s power under Article 3, by which the territories of States can be dismembered or altered. The 2019 Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Act, which bifurcated the former State of Jammu & Kashmir into two Union Territories—Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh—is an example. Once they have entered the Union, States do not have the right to withdraw or secede. Nor do they enjoy a guaranteed right to territorial integrity.
The IOA limited the scope of the Indian Dominion Government to the three subjects acceded to. The Merger Agreement went far beyond the terms of the IOA. The 1949 Agreement assaulted the core of Manipur’s identity as a historical and political civilisation. Transferring or handing over the full and exclusive authority of the administration and governance of one State to another is the most serious kind of international transaction and attracts established international norms. The integration of one independent country into another cannot take place without consulting the people concerned.
The Merger Agreement violated the customary norm of the freely expressed wishes of the people. This principle was first codified in two UN General Assembly resolutions—Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73(e) of the Charter (UNGA Res. 1541, 1960) and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (UNGA Res. 2625, 1970). These resolutions are accepted as among the most authoritative interpretations of the principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter. This principle was further recognised as a collective right of peoples to determine for themselves their political status in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR).
Exercise of Right to Self-Determination in Post-Colonial India
After India achieved independence, there have been instances where the right of peoples to self-determination was exercised. Among the peoples of the Princely States who exercised their right of self-determination by direct vote were those of Junagadh, Pondicherry and Sikkim. The people of Junagadh, through a plebiscite held on 20th February 1948, decided to join India. The people of Pondicherry, through their elected representatives, held a referendum on 18th October 1954 and decided to join India. The people of Sikkim, through their National Assembly, adopted on 14th April 1975 a resolution to integrate fully with India. Sikkim’s referendum was held after India made her reservations to Article 1 of ICCPR.
States that were not allowed to exercise such a right include Hyderabad, Travancore, Jammu & Kashmir and Manipur. The people of Manipur are yet to exercise such a right.
Indian Supreme Court: Coram Non Judice
Section 57 of the Manipur Constitution provides that if circumstances arise that prevent the proper operation, in law or spirit, of the Manipur Constitution, then the matter shall be referred by the Council of Ministers to a forum outside Manipur. India’s Supreme Court is coram non judice – forum without jurisdiction to assess the legality of the Manipur Merger issue. The scope of Articles 363 and 143 of India’s Constitution does not confer jurisdiction over this matter upon any court of law, including the apex court itself. A treaty concluded between two equal sovereigns can only be judged by an international tribunal. India’s Constitution itself recognises this limitation in Articles 363 and 143.
Manipur Constitution, 1947: A Living Constitution
The issue whether Manipur Constitution of 1947 is operational or not is clarified here again. This position was deliberated and clarified in the 14th Professor Naorem Sanajaoba Memorial Lecture held on 30th December, 2025. Article 372(1) of India’s Constitution provides that all laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the Constitution’s commencement shall continue in force until altered, repealed or amended by a competent legislature or authority. Article 372(3)(a) limited the President’s power to adapt or modify such laws to a period of three years from the commencement of the Constitution (though later extended and supplemented by Article 372A).
Manipur Constitution was “law in force” in the territory comprising Manipur immediately before 26th January 1950. It should have been expressly repealed or adapted or modified within the constitutionally prescribed period if it were to cease to have force within the Indian legal order.
The fact is that Manipur Constitution of 1947 was neither adapted nor modified under the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 nor under the Adaptation of Laws Orders of 1956 and 1957. On a strictly technical reading, this implies that the Manipur Constitution continued to subsist as part of the corpus of pre‑Indian Constitution law, unless specifically repealed by a competent legislature.
Competence to Repeal: Whether Indian Parliament have the authority?
Even assuming that, under Article 372, the Manipur Constitution could be treated as “law in force” in a territory absorbed into India, a deeper question arises. Did the Parliament of India possess legitimate authority to repeal, adapt or modify the Manipur Constitution, given Manipur’s sovereign independent status as established on 26th July, 1947 under its Constitution?
The implication is that, on the eve of India’s taking over of Manipur – 14th October, 1949, Manipur stood as a sovereign independent State in international law. Mere signing of Merger Agreement without putting it into execution through the Manipur Administration Order effective from 15th October, 1949 did not amount to losing Manipur’s independent identity to the Indian Dominion. During the period from 21st September until 14th October, 1949 Manipur continued to remain as a sovereign independent State. Manipur Constitution was drawn up by a body created under the instructions of the Manipur Maharajah and assented to by the monarch himself acting as the constitutional head. The Manipur Constitution was therefore not merely a sub‑constitutional statute but the basic law of a distinct sovereign entity, Manipur. India’s Parliament constituted in 1950 does not have the authority to repeal or modify the Manipur Constitution of 1947.
The Gauhati High Court in Ram Manohar Lohia v. V.S. Sundaram 1955 (Cri. L.J. 1603) stated that insofar the provisions of the Manipur Constitution are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Indian Constitution, it continues ‘to remain in force under Article 372 of the Constitution of India’. Manipur Constitution is still in effect.
Conclusion
To sum up, the constitutional transition of India from the federal premise of the Government of India Act, 1935 to the Union established under the Constitution of India, 1950 had profound implications for the Princely States, including Manipur. The Instrument of Accession, as adapted under the Indian Independence Act, 1947, was used to create a constitutional relationship between the Dominion of India and the States, but that transitional device was later drawn into a larger political project that culminated not in a federation, but in a Union with strongly centralising features. India became a Union of States under Article 1, while Article 3 made those States territorially alterable by Parliament. In this larger constitutional shift lay the logic of later measures such as State reorganisation beginning in 1953 and the abolition of Privy Purses through the Constitution (26th Amendment) Act, 1971—measures that steadily eroded the historical identity and autonomy of the States.
The assurances given by Sardar Patel and Mountbatten on 5th and 25th July 1947 respectively before the Chamber of Princes must therefore be read in this background. The promise attached to accession did not preserve the position of the States as it appeared to at that moment. Once absorbed into the Union, States had no right to secede, no right to withdraw, and no guaranteed right to territorial integrity. For that reason, any reading of Manipur’s position based only on the bare text of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Manipur Constitution Act, 1947, or the Instruments of Accession crafted within those frameworks—without understanding the surrounding historical and political context—can only produce a distorted understanding. Such interpretation must be avoided.
To argue that the IOA signed by Maharajah Bodhchandra on 11th August 1947 validly and conclusively established Manipur’s constitutional relationship with India is to disregard the relevant historical facts, political circumstances and constitutional limitations already in force in Manipur under Manipur Constitution at that time. Judged against the established constitutional norms and international conventions that prevailed, that Instrument of Accession of 1947 and Merger Agreement of 1949 were invalid and without legal effect. Precedents set in Junagadh, Pondicherry and Sikkim testifies the importance of valid and legitimate integration process. The idea that Instrument of Accession of 1947 made Manipur part of India is without scientific credibility.
Assistant Professor, Symbiosis Law School, Pune and can be reached at laishram.mangal@symlaw.ac.in. The views expressed herein are author’s own
