The imposition of President’s Rule in Manipur on February 13, 2025, placing the 12th Manipur Legislative Assembly under suspended animation, marks one of the most consequential constitutional interventions in the state’s political history since its merger with India. Unlike many past invocations of Article 356, this was not merely a response to the collapse of a coalition or legislative instability. It was the culmination of a prolonged violent conflict involving ethnic groups that eroded the authority of the elected government and paralysed civilian administration.
Yet nearly a year later, Manipur remains in a condition of political limbo – neither governed by an elected government nor moving decisively toward democratic restoration. The Assembly has not been dissolved. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) continues to command a numerical majority within it. Executive authority, however, rests entirely with the BJP-led Central Government, operating through the Governor and the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).
This unusual arrangement – a suspended Assembly with a retained majority and an extended President’s Rule – raises questions that go beyond Manipur. Is this a tactical pause to allow peace to return? Is it political insurance to protect the ruling party from risk? Or does it reflect a deeper strategic design shaped by electoral calculations, security concerns, and geopolitical considerations?
These questions became sharper following a closed-door meeting on December 14, 2025, when BJP legislators from Manipur were summoned to the party headquarters in New Delhi and instructed by senior leaders – General Secretary Organisation BL Santhosh and Northeast Coordinator Sambit Patra – to prioritise peace, ensure free movement, and visibly engage across ethnic lines. The BJP publicly stated that discussions focused on “peace and progress,” even as speculation about restoring an elected government was quietly ruled out.
At the heart of this moment lies a fundamental contradiction that has not been adequately confronted – How can MLAs of a suspended Assembly be expected to bring peace when the Central Government itself is directly ruling Manipur under President’s Rule?
Suspended Animation as a Political Instrument
Constitutionally, the decision to keep the Assembly under suspended animation rather than dissolve it preserves the option of restoring a government without fresh elections. Politically, this is a significant choice.
Suspension serves three immediate purposes for the ruling party at the Centre.
First, it prevents defections. With the Assembly intact and the promise – explicit or implied – of a possible return to power, MLAs have a strong incentive to remain within the party fold. Dissolution would expose them to prolonged uncertainty and political drift.
Second, it defers accountability. Under President’s Rule, governance failures – breakdown of law and order, humanitarian crises, displacement, administrative paralysis – are formally attributed to the Union rather than to a party-led state government. This insulation matters when the same party governs at the Centre.
Third, it creates a holding pattern, allowing the Centre to wait out volatility. Manipur’s violent conflict that erupted on May 3, 2023 is neither episodic nor easily containable. Suspension allows selective intervention without committing to a political outcome that might fail.
This explains why, despite rumours or interested speculations, the December 2025 meeting did not seriously consider reviving a BJP-led government. Peace, in this framework, is not merely a moral objective; it is a precondition for political risk management.
Power Without Governance, Governance Without Accountability
The BJP today faces a paradox in Manipur – it has numerical strength without political control, and formal authority without democratic legitimacy.
Restoring a BJP-led government prematurely would expose the party to immense risk. If such a government were to fail again – either administratively or morally – the consequences would be devastating:
In Manipur, it would erode whatever credibility the BJP retains ahead of the 2027 Assembly election.
Nationally, it would damage the party during a crucial electoral cycle in 2026, when Assembly elections are due in Assam, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Pondicherry.
Unlike Manipur, these states carry far greater electoral weight. Images of renewed violence or administrative collapse in Manipur under a restored BJP government would quickly be weaponised by political opponents elsewhere.
Thus, the Centre’s reluctance to restore an elected government should not be mistaken for indecision. It reflects electoral calculation, not disengagement.
The MLA Paradox: Authority Without Power
The most striking contradiction in the current arrangement is the role assigned to Manipur’s MLAs.
Under President’s Rule, MLAs possess no executive authority. They cannot:
- Direct the police or security forces
- Open highways or dismantle buffer zones
- Order disarmament or arms recovery
- Implement rehabilitation policies for IDPs
- Allocate resources or enforce administrative decisions
Law and order, security deployment, intelligence operations, and administrative control are exercised entirely by the Centre.
Yet these same MLAs are being instructed to restore peace, ensure free movement, and set an example by travelling across ethnic divides.
This expectation is structurally incoherent.
Peace in Manipur today is not a matter of persuasion alone. It depends on decisions regarding buffer zones, central force deployment, neutral policing, highway access, and engagement with armed groups – areas wholly outside the reach of suspended legislators.
The directive for MLAs to travel to each other’s areas becomes, therefore, largely symbolic. It creates the appearance of political engagement without the substance of governance.
Shifting Responsibility Without Transferring Power
By asking MLAs to shoulder the burden of peace while retaining centralised control, the Union Government appears to be shifting moral responsibility downward without devolving political authority.
This has two consequences.
First, it allows the Centre to subtly externalise blame. If peace does not return, the failure can be attributed to “local leadership” or “deep-rooted divisions,” even though decisive power rests with New Delhi.
Second, it creates asymmetric accountability. The Centre governs but does not fully own outcomes; MLAs are expected to persuade without power. This arrangement insulates the Union Government from direct political fallout while eroding the credibility of local representatives.
This is neither cooperative federalism nor shared responsibility. It is a calculated imbalance.
Peace as Performance Rather Than Transformation
The December 2025 meeting reveals another dimension of the strategy – peace as performance.
The BJP understands that peace imposed solely through central authority risks being perceived as coercive. Keeping MLAs visible – issuing appeals, crossing ethnic lines, staging gestures of reconciliation – creates an image of local ownership.
This serves multiple political purposes:
- It frames peace as organic rather than imposed.
- It creates continuity for a future BJP government.
- It allows selective attribution of success or failure.
However, symbolism cannot substitute for structural change. Communities living under conditions of displacement, restricted movement, and de facto segregation are unlikely to be persuaded by gestures alone.
Without dismantling buffer zones, restoring highway access, ensuring neutral security, and rebuilding trust in institutions, peace risks becoming an optical threshold – just enough stability to justify political transition, not enough to prevent relapse.
President’s Rule as an Extended Governance Model
A growing concern in Manipur’s public discourse is that President’s Rule itself has become a governance model, not a temporary exception.
From the Centre’s perspective, extended central rule offers:
- Direct administrative control
- Unmediated deployment of security forces
- Freedom from local political constraints
- Greater flexibility in border and security management
This is particularly relevant given Manipur’s strategic location along the Indo–Myanmar border and the instability in Myanmar. Security considerations provide a convenient justification for prolonged central control.
Yet Article 356 was never intended to function as a long-term substitute for democratic governance. Normalising extended President’s Rule risks hollowing out federalism and setting a dangerous precedent for other conflict-affected regions.
The Proxy War Narrative and Insurgency Politics
Within Manipur, another interpretation circulates – one that views prolonged President’s Rule as part of a proxy strategy to weaken or dismantle Meitei-led insurgent structures.
Whether empirically provable or not, the persistence of this narrative is itself politically significant. Perception matters. When communities believe constitutional mechanisms are being used selectively against them, alienation deepens.
History suggests that insurgencies are rarely resolved through prolonged central control alone. Peace achieved through exhaustion rather than reconciliation tends to be brittle and reversible.
Electoral Calculations Beyond Manipur
Manipur’s political fate cannot be separated from the BJP’s broader electoral map.
In Assam, the party governs and seeks consolidation.
In West Bengal, it aims to expand.
In Tamil Nadu and Kerala, it struggles for relevance.
In Pondicherry, it supports an alliance government.
A destabilised Manipur risks becoming a national embarrassment during this cycle. Conversely, a Manipur kept under managed stasis – neither collapsing nor resolving – minimises immediate electoral exposure.
This calculus does not necessarily imply malice. It reflects the reality that national parties prioritise national risks over regional aspirations, especially when the region lacks electoral weight.
Resolve First or Rule First?
The central strategic dilemma remains unresolved:
Should the Centre resolve the crisis first and then restore an elected government?
Or restore a BJP government to claim political ownership of peace?
Both options carry risks. Resolving the crisis without an elected government risks alienation and imposed solutions. Restoring a government too early risks failure and delegitimisation.
For now, the Centre appears to have chosen a third path – delay, hoping that time, security management, and incremental normalisation will create safer conditions for political transition.
Democracy Deferred, But at What Cost?
Legally, the suspension of the Manipur Assembly is defensible. Politically, its prolonged continuation is corrosive.
Democracy is not only about elections; it is about accountability, participation, and trust. Prolonged President’s Rule widens the distance between the state and its citizens, weakens institutions through disuse, and encourages the rise of parallel authorities.
Every additional month of suspended democracy deepens the risk that constitutional politics will lose relevance altogether.
Conclusion: Peace Cannot Be Outsourced to the Powerless
The question of how suspended MLAs can bring peace under President’s Rule exposes the central flaw in the current approach.
Peace cannot be outsourced to those denied power. Reconciliation cannot be delegated while authority remains centralised. Democracy cannot be postponed indefinitely without consequences.
If the Central Government believes peace is achievable under President’s Rule, it must own that responsibility fully and transparently. If it believes peace requires political leadership, it must restore meaningful authority to elected representatives.
Anything in between risks turning Manipur into a laboratory of managed instability – stable enough to avoid embarrassment, unstable enough to avoid accountability.
Manipur deserves more than symbolism and suspension. It deserves governance with responsibility, power with accountability, and peace rooted not in performance, but in justice, trust, and democratic legitimacy.
Senior Editor: Imphal Review of Arts and Politics
