For more than two millennia, Manipur existed as an internationally recognised political and cultural space inhabited by multiple ethnic groups originally Meiteis, Nagas, Pangals, along with the tribes who were migrated into Manipur in 1830s and loosely recognised as Kukis by the British, and others – who coexisted under a fluid but continuous political order anchored by the Manipur kingdom. Despite intermittent wars, shifting clan authority, migrations and cultural evolution, the region functioned as a shared homeland long before its contested merger with the Dominion of India in 1949. Yet the Manipur of today – marked by territorial anxieties, competing ethnic homelands, insurgent claims, administrative fractures, and the violent segregation since May 2023 – is a far more divided entity. In reality, the modern state faces a fundamental question – can Manipur remain geographically intact and socially coherent when its constituent groups increasingly articulate incompatible political futures?
The threats to Manipur’s territorial integrity are not sudden. They are the culmination of decades of political missteps, armed insurgencies, unresolved historical grievances, and state policies that deepened hill–valley divides. The Manipur crisis started on May 3, 2023 merely exposed a long-brewing fault line. Understanding the contemporary moment thus requires tracing the layered historical, political, militarised and social processes that have led Manipur to the brink of internal fragmentation.
Colonial Legacies and the Historical Foundation of Territorial Anxiety
Although the popular narrative often treats the hill-valley divide as an ancient truth, much of the rigid separation prevalent today is the legacy of British rule. After conquering Manipur in 1891, the colonial government instituted separate administrative regimes – the valley was governed directly by the king, while the hills were administered through the Manipur State Durbar under the direct responsibility of a British officer who held the post of the Vice-President of the Durbar. This structural deviation produced dual imaginations of authority and belonging. The administration in the valley developed some institutions linked to the Vaishnavite Meitei monarchy and the emerging political class. The hills were loosely governed through Manipur State Durbar retaining customary chiefs.
This divide was not merely administrative; it left a psychological imprint. The hills began to perceive themselves as separate from the valley-centric structures of power, and the valley elite developed a political imagination centred on the ancient Meitei kingdom. When Manipur regained a form of democratic self-governance in 1947, both the hills and valleys were governed under the Manipur Constitution Act 1947. But, the political geography of Manipur at the time of the 1949 merger with India was anchored in differences that would later be weaponised by armed groups and identity-based mobilisation.
The dissolution of the democratically elected Manipur State Assembly in 1949 after the controversial merger sowed deep resentment among the Manipuris especially Meiteis who viewed the process as illegitimate. This perception later fuelled insurgencies seeking to “restore sovereignty,” while some hill groups interpreted the merger as continuation of valley dominance under a new political framework. The seeds of later territorial contestations were thus sown in overlapping grievances – Meitei disenchantment with India over the merger, and tribal ambivalence toward structures based in the state capital.
Rise of Armed Insurgencies and Divergent Territorial Projects
From the 1960s onward, Manipur became one of South Asia’s most militarised landscapes, home to multiple insurgent groups with competing visions of territory and identity. Broadly, these can be classified into Meitei-led Manipur insurgencies, Naga insurgent movements, and later Kuki militant groups – each with distinct territorial claims, ideological motivations, and external networks.
Meitei-led Insurgent Groups and the Sovereignty Question
The first major insurgent group to emerge was the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) in 1964, followed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1978, the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), and later the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) and Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL). These groups, though ideologically varied, shared a common objective – the restoration of Manipur’s lost sovereignty. Their vision is centred on a territorially unified sovereign Manipur.
Therefore, the Meitei-led insurgencies – despite being anti-Indian – did not threaten Manipur’s internal territorial unity. If anything, they hardened Meitei consciousness about preserving the territorial boundaries of the historical kingdom against fragmentation by Naga or Kuki-Zomi identity movements. However, their armed campaigns expanded insecurity, deepening mistrust with hill communities and providing ground for counter-mobilisation.
Naga Nationalism and the Challenge of Greater Nagaland
By far the most serious long-term threat to Manipur’s territorial integrity has been the Naga demand for a “Greater Nagaland” or “Nagalim” – a political entity integrating all Naga-inhabited areas across Manipur, Nagaland, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Myanmar. NSCN (IM), with its strong base in Manipur’s Naga-dominated districts, became the principal force articulating this demand. The 2001 extension of the NSCN-IM ceasefire with the phrase “without territorial limits” sparked the largest political upheaval in Manipur’s recent history. Protests erupted across the Imphal Valley, culminating in the burning of the Manipur Legislative Assembly building and the death of 18 civilians. The episode exposed the visceral insecurities associated with any alteration to Manipur’s boundaries.
The United Naga Council (UNC)’s subsequent demand for an “Alternative Arrangement” outside Manipur’s administrative control – especially during the 2010 and 2016 highway blockades – further escalated territorial anxieties. The creation of seven new districts in 2016 was perceived by many Naga organisations as an attempt to dilute Naga’s land contiguity, triggering prolonged blockades on the state’s economic lifelines, National Highways 2 and 37. The Naga movement, although framed as self-determination, has consistently invoked a geography that requires carving out substantial areas from Manipur’s present map.
Kuki–Chin–Zomi–Hmar–Paite Movements and the quest for Kukiland or Zogam or Zoland
Parallel to Naga nationalism, Kuki-Chin-Zomi armed groups advanced their own territorial imagination. Through the 1990s and 2000s, groups under the Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and United People’s Front (UPF) demanded a Kukiland Territorial Council or even statehood. Organisations like the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) articulated broader Zo homeland (Zogam) spanning regions of Manipur, Mizoram and Myanmar. The Kuki–Paite/Zomi conflict of 1997–98, and before it the deadly Naga–Kuki conflict of 1992–97, further ethnicised the hills, generating ethnic homelands through exclusive ethnic identity politics marked by violence, displacement and territorial consolidation.
These movements may not have achieved cartographic changes, but they effectively redrew the social and political geography of the hills, producing exclusive ethnic territories governed in practice by armed groups, customary chiefs and parallel institutions.
Ethnic Conflict and Competing Claims over the Lands
Land has always been central to ethnic politics in Manipur. The valley, comprising just approximately 10 per cent of the state’s area but embracing more than 60 per cent of the population of all the ethnic groups, is perceived as governed by Meitei-dominated institutions by the tribal people who are actually holding the key positions of Civil Secretariat, the permanent executive of the government, while hill districts – legally reserved for Scheduled Tribes – are inhabited largely by peoples who are categorised as Naga and Kuki-Chin-Mizo-Zomi-Paite-Hmar tribes. This legal and demographic situation has generated mutually reinforcing insecurities. Hill communities fear cultural assimilation and political domination by the valley, whereas Meiteis and Pangals – unable to normally own landed properties in the hills – feel territorially squeezed in, especially as the population has grown.
The complex question of land ownership, forest rights, new village recognition without due process, and state-led eviction drives sharpened ethnic tensions in the decade preceding the 2023 conflict. For instance, the drive against “illegal settlements” in reserved forests was seen by many Kuki-Zomi organisations as a targeted campaign, while the valley viewed it as part of environmental protection as it affects the valley residents as well and combating narco-trafficking. Simultaneously, Naga groups opposed Kuki settlements in areas they claimed as ancestral land, leading to pre-2023 tensions in districts like Kangpokpi, the then Sadar Hills of Senapati district.
These land-based anxieties are not merely local disputes. They anchor competing territorial projects – a Naga homeland that requires a contiguous Naga geography, a Kuki-Zomi homeland that envisions linked territories from Churachandpur to Kangpokpi and Tengnoupal, and a Meitei responsibility to protect the historical borders of the kingdom while gaining access to land ownership across the state.
Highways as Battlefields and Instruments of Territorial Assertion
The National Highways running through Manipur are not just economic arteries; they are symbolic and strategic corridors of territorial control. Over the last three decades, highway blockades have become political weapons used primarily by Naga organisations but also by Kuki groups. The Manipur Valley, dependent on these highways for all essential supplies, has repeatedly been subjected to prolonged blockades – sometimes for months at a stretch.
Blockades during 2010, 2011, and 2016 had demonstrated how ethnic territorial movements could effectively hold the entire state hostage. The valley’s humiliation during these blockades has been one of the enduring sources of political alienation and resentment. Conversely, tribal groups have often argued that blockades are a legitimate form of protest in a political structure where elections offer little control to hill communities.
By the time the 2023 conflict erupted, the highways had already become contested zones of ethnic control. Since then, Meiteis have been prevented from using of NH-2 and NH-37, while state forces have implicitly recognised “buffer zones” separating Kuki and Meitei localities. These de facto borders undermine the very idea of a unified territorial entity, creating a reality where Manipur resembles two disconnected regions rather than a single state.
The 2023 – till date Crisis: From Manufactured Ethnic Violence to De Facto Partition
The events beginning on 3 May 2023 mark a turning point in Manipur’s political history. What started portraying as communal clashes quickly escalated into widespread ethnic cleansing of Meiteis from the Kuki-Zomi dominated districts, armed confrontations, and mass displacement. More than 61,000 people were uprooted from their homes. Entire districts became mono-ethnic. Inter-ethnic trust shattered almost overnight.
The consequences for territorial integrity are profound. For the first time in Manipur’s modern history, a large section of the population cannot safely cross certain districts. Security forces maintain militarised “buffer zones,” and even the movement of officials and supplies requires negotiation between state, central forces and local armed militant groups. In many areas, especially Churachandpur and Kangpokpi, Kuki-Zomi groups exercise de facto administrative authority. Valley districts, meanwhile, have mobilised Meitei volunteer forces and village defence groups during the height of Kuki-Zomi violent attacks. This is not simply law-and-order breakdown; it represents the emergence of parallel territorial sovereignties.
The demand by Kuki-Zomi organisations for a “Separate Administration” or even Union Territory carved out of the state the most direct challenge to Manipur’s territorial integrity since the Greater Nagaland or Nagalim agitation. In response, the organisations based in the valley – especially COCOMI – have asserted that any division of Manipur is unacceptable and non-negotiable. They argue that the crisis is the result of the state’s failure to maintain rule of law, restore the fundamental rights of all citizens, ensure the safe return of internally displaced persons, and re-establish a unified administrative order. Their demands emphasise not only public safety but also the need to prevent territorial fragmentation under the guise of conflict management.
The Interlocking Territorial Visions: A Zero-Sum Landscape
Understanding the severity of Manipur’s current crisis requires acknowledging that all three major ethnic blocs articulate incompatible territorial futures.
Meitei Vision
For many in the valley, territorial integrity is inseparable from political identity. The boundaries of Manipur are perceived as civilisational and historical truths going back millennia. Even among those who oppose insurgency, the idea of preserving the “ancestral land” is profoundly emotional. From this perspective, Naga and Kuki demands for territorial reorganisation are seen as existential threats. However, Meiteis stand for the aged-old coexistence of all the ethnic groups.
Naga Vision
The Naga project of nation-building requires contiguity. Without integrating the Naga-dominated districts of Manipur – particularly Ukhrul, Tamenglong, Senapati and Chandel –into a larger Naga homeland, the dream of a unified Naga people remains incomplete. This vision views Manipur’s present boundaries as colonial impositions rather than historical realities.
Kuki–Zomi Vision
For Kuki-Zo groups who have been migrating to Manipur since 1834, the primary political goal is a protected homeland where they cannot be dominated by “Meitei institutions” (state intitutions) or threatened by Naga competition. The recent violence has intensified the sense that coexistence in a unified Manipur is impossible without constitutional guarantees, territorial autonomy or statehood. Some diaspora narratives even imagine a transborder Zoland or Kukiland spanning India and Myanmar.
These visions overlap geographically and contradict each other politically. The valley cannot be territorially separated from the hills without destroying the idea of Manipur; the Naga homeland cannot exist without taking large hill districts out of Manipur; the Kuki-Zo homeland overlaps with both. The result is a territorial gridlock in which each group’s imagination threatens the existence of the others while the Meiteis and Pangals stand for coexistence of all the ethnic groups.
Migration, Borderlands and the International Dimension
Manipur’s geographical location bordering with Myanmar adds a transnational layer to its internal conflicts. Naga, Kuki and Meitei communities all have cross-border cultural and kinship ties. For Kuki-Chin-Zo groups in particular as they are late migrants from Burma, the proximity to Myanmar’s Chin State and parts of Sagaing Division has played a significant role in demographic change, military logistics, refugee flows and political aspiration.
The Free Movement Regime historically allowed borderland communities to maintain livelihoods across the Indo-Myanmar boundary. However, in recent years, many Meitei and Naga organisations have agreed that Kuki migration from Myanmar as a demographic and security threat. The state government’s “war on drugs” and forest eviction drives were interpreted through this lens, intensifying ethnic polarisation leading up to 2023.
The collapse of the Myanmar state after the 2021 coup further complicated matters, with refugees and armed cadres moving into Manipur’s border districts. These cross-border dynamics reinforced Kuki-Zo calls for territorial autonomy while deepening Meitei and Naga fears of demographic dilution and loss of land. Meanwhile, Naga groups also maintained active networks across the border. Thus, Manipur’s territorial crisis cannot be understood in isolation from the geopolitical realities of the Indo–Myanmar frontier.
The Role of the State: Weak Institutions and the Crisis of Legitimacy
A recurring theme in Manipur’s territorial fragmentation is the persistent weakness of state institutions. From policing to land administration, from environmental regulation to conflict management, the state apparatus has lacked the capacity and political legitimacy to act impartially.
The 2023– till date crisis exposed these weaknesses dramatically. Security forces failed to prevent the outbreak of violence and were later accused by different communities of bias. The enforcement of buffer zones, selective access to national highways, and the inability to restore basic freedoms of movement further entrenched ethnic segregation. The protracted displacement of tens of thousands of civilians – unable to return home even after two and half years – reveals a state unable to ensure even minimal conditions of coexistence.
Civil society groups have stepped into the vacuum, but this has had contradictory effects. While valley and hill organisations provide essential advocacy and community representation, they also deepen ethnic polarisation. For example, COCOMI emphasises protecting Manipur’s territorial integrity, restoring fundamental rights, and ensuring the safe return of internally displaced persons – demands that resonate in the valley but are perceived by some hill groups as attempts to restore valley dominance. Conversely, Kuki-Zo bodies articulate existential fears of “Meitei majoritarianism”, framing separate administration as the only viable protection.
The state’s inability to mediate these competing narratives or enforce the rule of law has allowed ethnic armed groups and local militias to emerge as de facto authorities. In several regions, especially Churachandpur and parts of Kangpokpi, they have replaced the state as primary actors. In the valley, armed volunteer groups have attained significant social legitimacy. When armed non-state actors become guarantors of security, the foundation of a unified territorial state erodes.
The Prospect of Fragmentation: Scenarios and Pathways
Manipur’s territorial integrity now faces multiple possible threats. The most direct is the demand for a separate Kuki-Zo administration. If granted, it would permanently partition the western and southern hill districts. The long-term Naga demand for Greater Nagaland or Nagalim remains unresolved despite almost three decades of peace talks. Any settlement that recognises Naga territorial claims would dramatically reshape Manipur’s boundaries.
Another scenario is “soft partition” – the maintenance of formal cartographic unity but the entrenchment of ethnic enclaves governed through separate security regimes and administrative mechanisms. This is arguably already underway – restricted highways, segregated districts, buffer zones and parallel authorities constitute a form of de facto division even without official territorial reorganisation as of now.
A third scenario is demographic fragmentation. If tens of thousands of internally displaced persons cannot return home, the ethnic geography of Manipur will be permanently altered. Entire communities will be uprooted from their ancestral districts, reshaping political claims for decades.
A more alarming possibility is the escalation of overlapping territorial visions into sustained armed standoffs. If Naga groups reassert territorial claims during the weakened state of the 2023–till date conflict, or if Kuki-Zo demands gain external support, the valley may respond with heightened militarisation. Such dynamics could set off a renewed cycle of ethnic conflict reminiscent of the 1990s but far more destructive given the current segregation.
Restoring Unity: What Would It Take?
Reversing the fragmentation of Manipur requires more than peace agreements or administrative adjustments. It requires rebuilding the possibility of coexistence in a violently segregated society. Several core principles must be addressed:
Restoration of fundamental rights and rule of law is essential. When citizens cannot safely travel across districts or return to their homes, territorial integrity becomes an abstraction.
Ensuring the safe return of internally displaced persons is non-negotiable. Without restoring pre-conflict demographics, any territorial settlement becomes a reward for ethnic cleansing.
Re-establishing state authority across highways, district headquarters and border areas is crucial. De facto armed control by militias cannot coexist with a functional territorial state.
Integrated land and forest governance must be developed in consultation with all ethnic groups. Policies perceived as unilateral will only intensify distrust.
A genuine federal or power-sharing arrangement within the state may be necessary. This does not require altering boundaries but could include greater local autonomy under constitutional frameworks acceptable to all.
Cross-ethnic dialogue is indispensable. The narrative that coexistence is impossible must be confronted with historical and contemporary evidence that Manipur has thrived as a multi-ethnic society for centuries.
Conclusion: A Heartland at a Crossroads
Manipur today stands at a profound crossroads. The state’s territorial integrity – once taken for granted – is now challenged simultaneously by armed movements, ethnic aspirations, identity politics, administrative failures, and the lived reality of segregation. What is at stake is not merely a boundary on a map, but the shared political and cultural inheritance of a people who have lived together for centuries. The crisis reflects three overlapping struggles – a struggle for land, a struggle for security, and a struggle for dignity.
Whether Manipur emerges from this moment as a unified political entity or fragments into ethnic enclaves depends on the choices made now – by political leaders, by civil society, and by the communities themselves. History shows that Manipur’s strength has always been its diversity and adaptability. Its survival will depend on whether it can rediscover those strengths under the most difficult circumstances in its modern history.
Senior Editor: Imphal Review of Arts and Politics
