When Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Manipur and addressed the public at Peace Ground, Churachandpur and Kangla Fort in Imphal on September 13, 2025, the symbolism was powerful. His speech, laced with references to “building bridges of trust” and sought to portray a conciliatory vision for a fractured state. Yet, conspicuously absent from the Prime Minister’s address, and from the coordinated chorus of senior leaders in his government and allied governors, was a direct engagement with the issue that animates Manipur’s indigenous anxieties – the inflow of illegal immigrants from Myanmar. It was his first visit to Manipur since the violent conflict that erupted in Manipur’s Churachandpur on May 3, 2023 where Kuki-Zomi groups including armed militants attacked the Meiteis in Churachandpur with burning down of houses and expanded their attack simultaneously in other Kuki-Zomi dominated districts on the same night including places Moreh, Kangpokpi, Pukhao, etc. in the Valley and the hill districts; and retaliatory mobs tried to storm Kuki-Zomi colonies in Imphal.
Instead, the discourse surrounding illegal immigration from the highest offices of the Indian state continues to focus on Bangladesh. Whether, in Amit Shah’s repeated warnings that India is “not a dharamshala” for infiltrators, R. N. Ravi’s dramatic claim that infiltration is a “strategic move for another partition,” or Modi’s Independence Day announcement of a “high-powered demography mission” to counter infiltration – the rhetorical and policy spotlight falls overwhelmingly on Bangladesh.
This article argues that the fixation on Bangladeshi infiltration obscures the gravity of Myanmar-origin migration in Manipur, precisely the phenomenon that groups like the Coordinating Committee on Manipur Integrity (COCOMI) and the United Naga Council (UNC) identify as the real demographic threat. The imbalance between the national narrative and Manipur’s local concern has profound implications – it risks erasing indigenous perspectives, exacerbating ethnic mistrust, and destabilising India’s frontier.
The National Narrative: Bangladesh as the Archetypal Threat
The rhetoric of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government’s Central leadership frames illegal immigration almost exclusively through the lens of Bangladesh.
Amit Shah’s Doctrine: India not a ‘Dharamshala’
During the passage of the Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025, Home Minister Amit Shah thundered that India is “not a dharamshala” for infiltrators, insisting that those who come with “malafide intentions” would be stopped. Though he briefly mentioned Rohingyas from Myanmar, his focus – especially in his attack on the Trinamool Congress for blocking fencing on the Bangladesh border – underscored Bangladesh as the main source of threat.
- N. Ravi’s Partition Anxiety
Tamil Nadu Governor R. N. Ravi, speaking at a conference on cross-border infiltration, warned that large-scale infiltration into the Northeast was a “strategic” move aimed at “engineering another partition.” Again, the subtext was Bangladesh. His speech linked infiltration to Bengal, Assam, and “other Northeastern states” but omitted the Myanmar dimension – ironic, given his long experience in Nagaland and the insurgency-prone Indo-Burma (Myanmar) frontier.
Modi’s Demography Mission
On August 15, 2025, Prime Minister Modi used his Independence Day address to launch a “high-powered demography mission” against infiltration. His language – describing infiltrators as “ghuspaithiyas” who seize tribal land, target women, and alter demography – carried a strong resonance with the RSS’s decades-old narrative of Bangladeshi infiltration. Government crackdowns across Indian cities, widely reported in the weeks after, focused on identifying Bangladeshis posing as Indian citizens.
PM Modi in Assam
While Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not mention even a word about the issue of illegal immigrants in his speech during Manipur visit; the day after Modi during his visit in Assam castigated the Congress for enabling “illegal immigration” from Bangladesh and for betraying Assamese sentiments. By recalling the Assam Agitation (1979–85), he explicitly tied his government’s stance to the historic anti-Bangladeshi mobilisation.
Together, these interventions cement the official story – illegal immigration is primarily a Bangladeshi issue, threatening demography, security, and culture.
The Overlooked Dimension: Myanmar and Manipur
Yet for Manipur, the central threat is not Bangladesh but Myanmar. The state shares a porous 398-kilometre border with Myanmar, across which kinship-based migration has long occurred. The escalation of Myanmar’s civil war after the 2021 coup, coupled with the Rohingya crisis, has intensified this flow.
Numbers and Patterns
While India may host millions of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants overall, the Myanmar-origin presence may appear smaller as estimated approximately 75,000 nationwide since military coup in Myanmar on February 1, 2021. However, for a small state like Manipur (population of approximately three million), even tens of thousands of migrants can be demographically disruptive. Many in Manipur believe that illegal immigration of Myanmar nationals into Manipur dates back to 1950s after Manipur was merged into India on October 15, 1949.
The Indigenous Alarm
Groups like COCOMI and UNC argue that unchecked immigration from Myanmar, particularly by Kuki-Chin-Zo/Zomi groups fleeing conflict, is altering Manipur’s ethnic equilibrium. COCOMI insists that these settlements, often in reserved forest land, threaten Meitei and Naga demographic security. The UNC shares similar apprehensions – demographic tipping could marginalise Nagas as well, especially in border districts like Ukhrul, Kamjong, Tengnoupal and Chandel.
Governor Bhalla’s Ambiguity
During Modi’s September 13, 2025 visit, Manipur Governor Ajay Kumar Bhalla warned against “encroachment by people from beyond the borders.” While his phrasing hinted at Myanmar migrants, he stopped short of naming them. This ambiguity reflects the political reluctance to spotlight Myanmar migration explicitly.
The Geopolitical Tightrope: Why India Downplays Myanmar-Origin Migration
India’s silence on Myanmar-origin immigration is not only about electoral arithmetic or narrative convenience. It is also deeply entangled with geopolitics.
- The Junta Factor: Since the 2021 coup, Myanmar has been ruled by the military junta. India, unlike the West, has refrained from isolating the regime, preferring a policy of cautious engagement. This is driven by several concerns:
- Security Cooperation: The Indian Army depends on cooperation with Myanmar’s military to curb insurgent sanctuaries of Naga and Manipuri insurgent groups across the border. New Delhi cannot afford to antagonise Naypyidaw by branding its fleeing citizens “illegal infiltrators.”
- Act East Policy: Connectivity projects such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit and the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway require at least tacit cooperation of the junta.
- Chinese Influence: Alienating the junta risks driving it deeper into Beijing’s embrace – a scenario India is desperate to avoid.
- The PDF Factor: Ethnic Militias and the Kuki-Chin-Zo/Zomi Dimension: Complicating matters further is the role of the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), the umbrella of anti-junta resistance. Many Kuki–Chin-Zo/Zomi armed groups straddling the Indo-Myanmar border have ties to these forces. Some are part of the ethnic resistance against the junta, while also linked to communities in Manipur and Mizoram.
- Ethnic Kinship: Kukis and Chins or Zo/Zomis are trans-border communities. Labelling their inflow as “illegal” risks alienating kin groups in Mizoram and Manipur, where sympathy for the PDFs, Chin National Front (CNF) or other Chin militant groups is strong.
- Strategic Hedge: New Delhi recognises that the junta may not last forever. By keeping lines open to PDF-linked groups, India preserves leverage for a post-junta Myanmar.
- Domestic Stability: If New Delhi were to call out Kuki-Chin-Zo/Zomi migration directly, it could inflame Manipur’s ethnic fault lines further, destabilising the state and complicating India’s counter-insurgency posture.
- Strategic Ambiguity as Policy: The result is a studied ambiguity – Indian leaders speak of “encroachers from beyond borders” (Ajay Kumar Bhalla), of “infiltrators changing demography” (Narendra Modi), or of “partition-like threats” (R. N. Ravi), but rarely pin these charges on Myanmar migrants. Bangladeshis become the rhetorical scapegoat because they are geopolitically easier to confront. Myanmar-origin migrants, particularly Kukis, Chins or Zo/Zomis, remain the elephant in the room.
Consequences for Manipur
This narrative dissonance between New Delhi and Imphal has destabilising effects.
- Marginalisation of Indigenous Concerns: By focusing discourse on Bangladesh, the Centre sidelines the indigenous anxieties of Manipur’s Meiteis and Nagas, who perceive Myanmar-origin migration as the real demographic threat. This breeds alienation and fuels narratives that Delhi is indifferent to Manipur’s survival.
- Escalating Ethnic Polarisation: When the Centre refuses to explicitly address Myanmar immigration; Meitei-led state organisations like COCOMI feel compelled to sharpen their rhetoric. Kukis, in turn, interpret such discourse as delegitimising their presence. The result is hardened ethnic polarisation.
- Policy Blind Spots: Practical measures – fencing along the Indo-Myanmar border, biometric tracking of migrants, repatriation diplomacy with Myanmar – remain underdeveloped compared to the Indo-Bangladesh frontier. Without tailored policy, Manipur’s demographic churn intensifies.
- Risk of a Parallel “Assam Accord” Moment: As the Assam Agitation was fuelled by fears of being overwhelmed by Bangladeshis; a similar mobilisation could erupt in Manipur if local concerns remain unaddressed. The Meitei and Kuki-Zomi divide of 2023 may foreshadow a broader agitation against “outsiders.”
The Demographic Imbalance Argument
COCOMI and UNC’s apprehensions hinge on the fear of demographic imbalance. They argue, among others, that forest and hill encroachments by Myanmar-origin settlers change land-use patterns; Mushrooming new villages; Demographic growth among migrant communities, if unchecked, could numerically overwhelm Meiteis and Nagas. This shift could translate into political consequences – altered constituency boundaries, reserved seats, and voting patterns.
Ironically, Prime Minister Modi himself, in his Independence Day speech, acknowledged that “when demographic changes take place in border areas, it causes a threat to national security.” Yet his words were clearly framed with Bangladesh in mind, not Myanmar. This double standard is glaring to Manipur’s indigenous groups.
Toward a Balanced Approach
A truly national immigration strategy must:
- Name Myanmar Migration Explicitly: Ambiguity only fuels suspicion. The Centre must acknowledge that Myanmar-origin migration is a distinct and pressing issue in Manipur.
- Strengthen the Indo-Myanmar Border: Not just fencing but proper and strict border management , smart surveillance, and community participation must extend to the Myanmar border, not remain confined to Bangladesh.
- Institute a National Refugee Law: Differentiating refugees from illegal migrants would allow India to manage humanitarian obligations without conflating them with demographic threats.
- Dialogue with Indigenous Organisations: Engaging COCOMI, UNC, and other local stakeholders would bridge the gap between New Delhi’s Bangladesh-centric discourse and Manipur’s Myanmar-centric concerns.
- Regional Diplomacy: Just as Delhi pressures Dhaka on repatriation, it must explore bilateral or multilateral frameworks with Myanmar to regulate migration – difficult, but essential.
Conclusion: Electoral Politics vs. Survival Politics
The disjuncture between national rhetoric and local reality is stark. For Modi, Shah, and Ravi, the spectre of illegal immigration is a Bangladeshi infiltrator threatening India’s unity. For Manipur’s indigenous peoples, it is the Myanmar nationals who alters their demographic landscape.
This divergence is not merely semantic. It reflects two very different political imperatives. Delhi’s approach is shaped by electoral politics – the salience of Bangladeshi immigration in Assam, West Bengal, and Tripura, states critical to the BJP’s fortunes. To attack Bangladeshis as infiltrators is electorally rewarding, ideologically consistent with Hindutva narratives, and geopolitically safe.
By contrast, Manipur’s anxiety is survival politics. For Meiteis and Nagas, Myanmar-origin immigration is not about votes only but about cultural continuity, land security, and demographic survival. To ignore this is to risk transforming a historical frontier community into a minority in its own homeland.
The Centre’s Bangladesh fixation may win votes in Assam and West Bengal, but in Manipur it rings hollow. Indigenous groups like COCOMI and UNC hear in it a wilful refusal to confront the actual source of demographic change. The result is deepening alienation: Manipur feels unseen, its existential fears subsumed under the electoral calculus of the heartland.
If the national leadership continues to cast Bangladesh as the archetypal infiltrator while downplaying Myanmar-origin migration, it risks repeating the mistakes of the Assam Accord era – belated recognition of local grievances, after unrest has already exploded.
The challenge, therefore, is not only to secure borders but to secure trust – to assure the Meiteis and Nagas that their concerns are heard, that their demographic fears are not dismissed as parochial, and that India’s unity does not come at the cost of Manipur’s indigeneity. For Manipur, this is not about electoral swings; it is about survival itself.
Senior Editor: Imphal Review of Arts and Politics
