The first phase of Myanmar’s general elections held after five years since the February 2021 military coup, concluded on December 28. There will be two more phases, on January 11 and 25. The results, which many international organisations, including the United Nations, have ruled will be no more than a sham to legitimise the military’s hold on the country’s politics, will be out by February.
The coup emersed Myanmar in a violent civil war along several ethnic and political faultlines, leading many to conclude these elections will be violence marred, besides deepening existing social fissures. Thankfully, there have been no reports of major election-related escalation of violence in the first phase, although it is too early to predict if this will hold for the rest of the elections and thereafter.
These elections do appear hollow considering only 57 political parties are contesting for the two union legislative houses and 14 unicameral assemblies, one each for its seven states and seven regions. Numerous other parties, including National League for Democracy, NLD, of Aung San Suu Kyi, which won a landslide victory in the 2020 election and came to power before being ousted three months later by the coup led by General Min Aung Hlaing, will not be contesting.
The NLD and the other parties refused to register with the Union Election Commission, and have thereby been dissolved. According to estimates, these parties together received 70 percent votes in 2020 election and won 90 percent seats in the union as well as regional legislative houses. Moreover, in 65 of the country’s 330 townships (sub-divisions), elections will not be held on security considerations.
Of the two union legislative houses, the lower house, Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives) has 440 seats, of which 330 are elected and 110 reserved for military appointees. The upper house Amyotha Hluttaw (House of Nationalities) has 224 seats of which 168 are elected and 56 reserved for military appointees. By a provision of the country’s 2008 constitution, 25 percent of seats in all legislative houses are reserved for the military.
While the 2021 coup was reprehensible, the important question is, ‘what now’? Broadly, there have been two different approaches to this. One is moralistic and the other pragmatic. The former is near universal and needs no further explanation. The latter is best exemplified by the China’s stance.
Singapore based Chinese policy analyst journal “Think China” best explains this position in a recent article. China sees Myanmar from its own geopolitical interest and considers “a stable Myanmar is far more aligned with Beijing’s core interests in Southeast Asia than a fractured Myanmar.”
Initially, Beijing considered the Junta and its leader General Aung Hlaing as anti-China and this was reinforced by the latter’s consistent refusal to crack down on scam centres in northern Shan State which were ensnaring Chinese citizens across the border. In the early months of the coup it was widely reported that Beijing was leaving its options open and was in touch with both the underground National Unity Government, NUG, of Suu Kyi as well as the State Administrative Council, SAC, of the Junta.
It was even speculated that Beijing had a part in the formation of the Three Brotherhood Alliance of three powerful ethnic armed groups, EAO, Arakan Army, AA, of the Rakhine people, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, MNDAA, of the Kokang people, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army, TNLA, of the Ta’ang people.
In October of 2023, this alliance made concerted assaults and delivered crushing defeats to Junta positions in northern Shan State, capturing many important townships, including border trading hub Lashio. These defeats were crucial for they emboldened other rebels across the country, stretching Junta logistics and putting it under tremendous pressure.
It was at this point that China shifted stance, realising a defeat of the military was most likely to splinter the country into many statelets, jeopardising Beijing’s geopolitical strategy leaving it to deal with several and not one country, and by inviting entrenchment of rival powers interests in this theatre. Interestingly, this need for centralisation to avoid disintegration has also complicated the civil war itself. As a report by International Crisis Group indicated, there are several civil militias “Pyusawhti” fighting on behalf of the Junta too.
Beijing went ahead to broker peace between Junta and EAOs it exercised considerable influence on, in particular MNDAA and TNLA. It also restrained the United Wa State Army, UWSA, probably the best-armed EAO, from selling arms to other ethnic groups.
This led to the Junta gaining lost grounds in many rebel-held regions. China also began encouraging the Junta to go ahead with its elections plan. Quite obviously, it is not democracy per se but its own strategic interest which prompted China to take this approach, Think China cites analyst David Mathieson.
Another analyst Sun Yun, director, China Programme, Stimson Centre, Washington, aligns with this view saying the “only viable solution is gradual reform, not a complete revolution. A structured election is the most likely way to achieve this.”
India’s position too, although not as visible as China’s, leans towards pragmatism. An indication is that Prime Minister, Narendra Modi met with General Aung Hlaing in the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Tianjin, China, on 31 August 2025.
The alternation between military and civil rule has now become cyclic in Myanmar. Hence, the 2010 election after the adoption of the 2008 constitution, too was boycotted by NLD and other parties. After Thien Sein, a retired military officer leading the Union Solidarity and Development Party won and became president, he liberally allowed reregistration of deregistered parties. When byelections to 45 vacant seats were announced in 2012, NLD decided to contest 44 seats and won 43. In the next general election in 2015, NLD won by a comfortable majority.
The best-case scenario for Myanmar under the present sorry circumstance then is for the current election to turn out to be only an honourable exit strategy of the Junta, ultimately ushering back civilian rule as in the 2012 byelections.
This article was first published in The New Indian Express. The original can be read here
Editor, Imphal Review of Arts and Politics and author
