By Mauro Primavera, Catholic University of Sacred Heart, Milan in Milano
A rebel coalition led by HTS has brought down Assad’s regime, opening a new chapter in Syria’s history.
Three weeks after forces led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) ousted President Bashar al-Assad on December 8, 2024, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa – previously known as Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani – has announced that elections in the war-ravaged country may take up to four years, citing the need for a new constitution and a nationwide census to determine voter eligibility.
The comments come as Damascus seeks to reassure neighbours and international powers of its commitment to stability and reform.
Al-Sharaa also reaffirmed Syria’s strategic ties with Russia, a key military ally during the 13-year conflict, and expressed hopes for improved relations with the United States under President-elect Donald Trump, including the lifting of sanctions imposed on Syria.
Syria’s sudden political transformation
In just a few days, Syria underwent a significant political transformation. After more than 13 years of civil war, on November 27, 2024, a broad rebel coalition led by the prominent Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a surprise attack from Idlib against government troops.
By December 8, this offensive had led to the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. While little is known about the political programme and state-building plans of HTS leader, the fall of the regime opens a new chapter for the country and marks a watershed moment for the entire Middle Eastern geopolitical landscape.
A long-standing regime crumbles in ten days
It is crucial to examine the factors that led to the collapse of the Baathist state after 61 years of authoritarian rule. During the 2011 Arab Spring, Assad brutally suppressed peaceful mass protests but struggled to maintain unity in Syria due to regional isolation, international sanctions, and institutional fragility.
From 2015 onwards, Damascus, with military support from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, launched a successful campaign to recapture major cities and provinces, including Aleppo. In March 2020, a ceasefire brokered by Turkey and Russia took effect, halting military operations and stabilising frontlines. The government regained control over two-thirds of the country, while rebels held Northwestern Syria, and the Kurds governed the Rojava region.
Assad was the only autocrat to survive the proto-revolutionary movements of the Arab Spring. He also managed to repair ties with several Arab governments, achieving full reintegration into the Arab League in 2023 through the mediation of the United Arab Emirates and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia.
Internal weakness
Several factors contributed to the fall of the Assad regime. Chief among these was the internal dysfunction of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). Despite past successes, the national army began to lose manpower during the ceasefire and became heavily reliant on foreign support.
The government’s plan to transform the SAA into a professional force by eliminating conscription never materialised due to rampant corruption within the army’s upper ranks, which obstructed serious reform efforts.
Furthermore, strong foreign influence fragmented the SAA, fostering loyalty to external actors. For instance, the 25th Division – an elite unit formerly known as the “Tiger Forces” – was closely integrated with Russian forces. Meanwhile, the growing prominence of Shia militias backed by Hezbollah and Iran marginalised SAA regular soldiers, who were predominantly Sunni.
Beyond sectarian divisions, conscripts suffered from worsening socio-economic conditions, exacerbated by the inflationary spiral that gripped Syria in 2023. Starved of resources, the government was forced to cut or freeze subsidies for the army, leading to a sharp decline in soldiers’ wages. When HTS militias advanced towards the capital, Assad raised salaries by 50%, but this was seen as a desperate move that underscored the regime’s fragility.
Socially, Assad’s relationship with his religious community, the Alawites – the backbone of his forces – deteriorated significantly. Despite their loyalty, the regime failed to address the needs of the broader Alawite community, leaving most to endure dire conditions while a select few benefited from regime patronage.
In this context, Ahmad al-Sharaa’s strategy proved effective: he pledged to avoid exploiting sectarian divisions and assured all segments of Syrian society they would have a role in shaping the political and economic future of the country.
Psychological factor and HTS role
Another critical factor was the exceptional regional circumstances that hindered intervention by Assad’s allies. Russia, embroiled in the costly conflict in Ukraine, had been reducing its military presence in Syria for two years and provided only limited support against HTS, primarily through sporadic airstrikes.
Iran was similarly preoccupied, focusing its resources on the conflict in Gaza and Lebanon and its confrontation with Israel following Hamas’ “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s military strength was significantly weakened after Israel eliminated its chain of command, including its charismatic leader Hassan Nasrallah.
These developments severely affected the Syrian Arab Army’s performance. The partial disengagement of allies demoralised the army, which found itself increasingly isolated in its efforts to counter the rebels’ offensive.
HTS’s moderate and conciliatory approach further accelerated the SAA’s internal disintegration. The Islamist organisation offered amnesty to defecting Sunni conscripts and Alawites alike. Many Shiites chose to secure a political and social role under HTS rather than remain loyal to an exhausted and collapsing regime.
HTS innovative warfare
Another key factor was the advanced tactics and military technology employed by the HTS coalition. Over the years, Tahrir al-Sham developed a sophisticated military apparatus, including a fully-fledged military academy, central command, specialised infantry, sniper units, and weapons manufacturing facilities.
Additionally, HTS artillery had access to a significant arsenal, acquired either by disarming other rebel groups or capturing equipment from the regime in battle. This arsenal included tanks, drones, cruise missiles, rockets, and mortar shells.
The group improved its tactics and strengthened military coordination with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), reducing its reliance on truck bombs and suicide attacks. Confronted by this well-equipped adversary, government forces were unprepared to repel the offensive.
A chance for renewal
While the Assad regime’s internal weaknesses were well-documented, the reluctance of Moscow and Tehran to offer unwavering support, combined with HTS’s enhanced military capabilities and innovative tactics, likely contributed to its swift downfall – an outcome that seemed improbable after 13 years of civil conflict.
The fall of an authoritarian system opens a critical window for reimagining the country’s future. However, the international community and regional stakeholders must remain vigilant.
HTS’s conciliatory rhetoric, promising inclusivity, should be tested through actions, and efforts should be made to ensure that any new political order promotes stability, pluralism, and reconstruction.
Mauro Primavera, Ph.D. in Institutions and Policies from the Catholic University of Sacred Heart, Milan, is a post-doc researcher at the University of Padua. He is also researcher at OASIS International Foundation and Teaching Assistant in Geopolitics, History of Islamic Asia, and History of Civilisation and Political Culture at the Catholic University of Sacred Heart, Milan. His research focuses on the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean and the history of Syria, particularly during the Baathist period.
Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info™.
Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info™
