Prologue
Hours after the Chief Minister tendered his resignation, the Governor of Manipur issued an Order, in effect, rescinding his January 24th Order summoning the Manipur Legislative Assembly. The Assembly last sat on 12th August 2024 for the Monsoon Session and the session was eventually prorogued. In terms of the constitutional mandate laid down in Article 174(1) of the Constitution, six months should not have intervened between the last sitting of one session and the date appointed for the first sitting of the next session. By his January 24th Order, the Governor had summoned the Legislative Assembly to meet on 10th February. After the Chief Minister’s resignation in the evening of 9th February, the Governor was left with no choice but to rescind the summoning of the Assembly as no effective business could have been transacted in the absence of a responsible Council of Ministers. Six months would have intervened since the last sitting of the previous session by 13th February. If the Assembly did not sit at least on 12th February, 2025, Article 174(1) would stand infringed. For the Assembly to sit, a new Chief Minister, if not the entire Council of Ministers had to take oath. It appeared that the majority party was in a race against time to elect its Legislature Party Leader, who would take oath as the new Chief Minister. What emerged was a constitutional conundrum! Eventually, in the late evening of 13th February, Manipur came under President’s Rule.
Infraction of Article 174(1) – A ground for invoking Article 356?
Article 356 of the Constitution, colloquially referred to as “President’s Rule”, is resorted to when the President is satisfied that “a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution”. In the case of Manipur, without ambiguity, Article 174(1) stood infringed on 13th February on a literal interpretation of the Constitution. Constitutional and legal experts weighed in on the consequences of infraction of Article 174(1) and two divergent views emerged.
One view was that President’s Rule in Manipur was inevitable since the Constitution has been violated and a constitutional crisis has been triggered. On the contrary, another view was that President’s Rule could be avoided. The rationale stems from the non-existence of the cabinet, connoting absence of a government in Manipur, thus rendering the 6-month deadline automatically inoperative. I concur with the latter view but for entirely different reasons.
In this article, I argue that infraction of Article 174(1) cannot be the sole ground for invoking Article 356 and the circumstances which led to such an infraction require further examination. The infraction, coupled with other considerations, must demonstrate a situation where the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. In the subsequent paragraphs, two reasons are set out which form the basis of my premise.
(i) Interpreting the Constitution – A pragmatic approach is necessary
Chief Justice Misra, speaking for himself and Khanwilkar, J., in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018 INSC 790), elucidated – “…The Constitution would become a stale and dead testament without dynamic, vibrant and pragmatic interpretation. Constitutional provisions have to be construed and developed in such a manner that their real intent and existence percolates to all segments of the society. That is the raison d’etre for the Constitution.”
Our Constitution is often referred to as a “living document” and the Constitution must be interpreted pragmatically. If we revisit Indian constitutional history, in its 75 years as a Republic, our constitutional courts have time and again been posed with complex legal questions involving interpretation of the Constitution. When posed with such questions, unlike the Supreme Court of the United States, which exerts immense thrust on textualism, the Supreme Court of India has taken recourse to pragmatic constitutionalism.
While addressing the malaise of caste-based discrimination in prisons in India, Chief Justice Chandrachud, in Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India (2024 INSC 753), posited, “…Our interpretation of the Constitution must fill the silences in its text. The framers of the Constitution could not have anticipated every situation that might arise in the future. They also intentionally left certain decisions to the discretion of future generations…”.
Manipur presents a rare and unique case – one that the framers of the Constitution could not have anticipated. If the Chief Minister had not resigned on 10th February and if the House had not sat by 12th February, for whatsoever reasons, it would have been an entirely different case. But that was not the case. With no responsible government, no effective business could have been transacted in the House. In the absence of a cabinet, the Governor could have summoned the Assembly, only to sit for “Obituary References”. This would have satisfied a textualist’s interpretation of Article 174(1) averting the infraction. Paradoxically, such a sitting would have been in the teeth of the intent of the founding fathers. This underscores the necessity of a pragmatic approach to interpreting the Constitution.
On a pragmatic interpretation of Article 174(1), under extraordinary circumstances, if the House could still sit within a reasonable period after the expiry of the 6-month deadline, there ought to be no quarrel with the essence and intent of Article 174(1). In my opinion, a week’s time would connote reasonable time and any duration beyond that would frustrate the pragmatic interpretation. In Manipur’s case, there is no gainsaying the circumstances were extraordinary. But, if the majority party was in a position to elect its Legislature Party Leader within a week’s time, swearing-in of the new Chief Minister, summoning, and sitting of the House could follow in seriatim. Now, if there is a likelihood of the House sitting within a week after the expiry of the deadline under Art. 174(1), resorting to Article 356 only for a mere technical infraction of Art. 174(1) would be farcical in a parliamentary democracy.
(ii) Constituent Assembly Debates and the Gujarat Elections case
Constituent Assembly Debates are said to be the key to open the minds of the framers of the suprema lex. While dealing with constitutional problems, our constitutional courts have consistently placed reliance on these debates to discern the intent of the framers. Irrespective of the text of the Constitution, a dissection of these debates ensures that the object of the framers does not go unnoticed.
Highlighting the significance of the Constituent Assembly Debates in interpreting the Constitution, a 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, in S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab (2001 INSC 373), observed – “…It is a settled position that debates in the Constituent Assembly may be relied upon as an aid to interpret a constitutional provision because it is the function of the Court to find out the intention of the framers of the Constitution.”
Article 153 of the Draft Constitution corresponds to Art. 174 of the Constitution. When Draft Art. 153 came up for discussion before the Constituent Assembly, the provision mandating minimum sittings of the legislature was not gone through in detail. This was because Draft Art. 69 (Art. 85 in the Constitution), which laid down similar provision in respect of the Union Legislature, had been elaborately debated.
Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, addressing the concerns expressed by the members of the Assembly regarding the provision on minimum sittings, clarified – “Therefore my submission to the House is that what we have provided is sufficient by way of a minimum. So far as the maximum is concerned the matter is left open and for the reasons which I have mentioned there is no fear of any sort of the executive remaining content with performing the minimum obligation imposed upon them by this particular clause.”
Here, the word “minimum” assumes much significance. Usage of the word “minimum” implies that the only intention of the framers in stipulating the 6-month mandate was to ensure a minimum of two sessions of the Legislature, if not more, in a calendar year. In fact, prior to the First Amendment of the Constitution, Art. 174(1) mandated the summoning of the State Legislature at least twice in a year. This was in addition to the 6-month rule. Later on, the “twice in a year” rule was omitted as this led to practical difficulties. The text of Art. 174(1), as it originally stood, gives impetus to the interpretation that the 6-month rule is more of a “safety valve” to pre-empt usurpation of power by the executive. By incorporating the 6-month rule, the framers never intended to lay down a strict timeline for meeting of the Legislature and the rule was put in place to ensure at least two sessions of the Legislature in a year.
Gujarat Elections matter – While answering the reference under Article 143(1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court extensively referred to the Constituent Assembly Debates in this matter. Although the reference concerned the interpretation of Art. 174(1), this pertained to dissolved legislatures only. That being said, the Special reference is crucial for the purposes of the present discussion.
Pasayat, J., in his concurring opinion, in Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, In Re (AIR 2003 SC 87) held that the provisions of Article 174 pertaining to the time period between two sessions are mandatory in respect of live Assemblies but do not apply to dissolved Assemblies. On the question whether any infraction of Art. 174 would attract invocation of Art. 356, Justice Pasayat clarified – “Merely because the time schedule fixed under Article 174 cannot be adhered to, that per se cannot be the ground for bringing into operation Article 356.” (Emphasis supplied)
The Supreme Court’s holding in the Special Reference leaves no room for doubt on the question of recourse to Art. 356 for a technical violation of Art. 174(1). If Art. 356 could be brought into operation solely on technical violation of the Constitution, it would have fallen foul of the object of Art. 356.
Epilogue
For the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs, resort to Art. 356 solely on the mere failure of the legislature to comply with the 6-month mandate under Art. 174 is not in consonance with constitutional principles and established legal precedent. Recourse to Art. 356 would be apposite – I must hasten to add – if the technical infraction of Art. 174 is coupled with other circumstances satisfying the conditions precedent for invoking Art. 356. One of these circumstances may be the likelihood of the legislature failing to meet even after a reasonable time has lapsed following the expiry of the 6-month period.
In Manipur’s case, no doubt, there was a technical infraction of Art. 174(1). Nevertheless, the House could have sat if a new Chief Minister had taken oath within a reasonable time, even after the lapse of the 6-month period. But, for this to happen, the majority party was required to elect its Legislature Party (LP) Leader. It is not known if the Governor felt that the majority party was unlikely to elect its LP Leader within the reasonable time. If the Governor was of the opinion that there was no likelihood of the majority party electing a new LP Leader within the reasonable time, the President may be justified in invoking Art. 356. Conversely, if it appeared that the majority party was likely to elect a new LP Leader within a reasonable time (a week), it would be preposterous to invoke Art. 356, only for it to be revoked a week later. In the latter circumstance, President’s Rule in Manipur could well have been avoided.
While parting, I leave with a caveat – “danger to national integration or security of the state” is one of the “sole” justifiable grounds, as laid down by a 9-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994 INSC 111), for invoking Art. 356. The Governor of Manipur may have cited this ground in his report to the President. In my article, I have only examined whether President’s Rule in Manipur was avoidable by assuming the technical infraction of Art. 174(1) as the cause for invoking Art. 356 in the State.
The writer is an advocate and practices at the High Court of Manipur
